主體對於認識對象所形成的信念並不必然符合於事實而為真，本文以符合於事實的判斷為知識。我們發現荀子業已指出不論是從知覺、名實關係或幻覺所產生的信念都有出錯的可能，是而對於信念的求真與除錯變成為知識理論中不可或缺的要求。荀子認為當主體處於「虛壹而靜」的認識 狀態下，其所形成的信念由於排除了認識之蔽塞，不會有出錯的可能，是而此信念必然符合於事實而可為知識。本文稱「虛壹而靜」的要求為知識的倫理規範。此外，荀子亦認為藉由「辨合、符驗」與「起而可設，張而可施行」等兩種方式，可以檢證信念是否合於客觀事實。是之為真而為知識，反之則否。本文以此為荀子對於知識的檢證方式。

Belief is not always in line with fact. Knowledge is generated only when belief is consistent with fact. Xunzi indicates that one’s belief originating from perception, illusion, and name-substance relationship may deviate from the fact,so a method used to justify the belief is necessary. He argues that the belief-fact consistency can only appear under the hsü-yi-ching（虛壹而靜）situation because the impediment of knowing no longer exists. This article treats hsü-yi-ching as an ethical standard of knowledge. In addition, Xunzi argues that the following two methods can be used to examine whether a belief-fact gap exists. The first one is pien-ho and fu-yen（辨合、符驗）. The second one is feasibility. More precisely, a match of belief and fact appears when “those who sit and talk can prove that their speech is doable”（坐而言之，起而可設張而可施行）. The author deems these two methods as the “justification of knowledge.”