本論文主張即便我們在倫理上成功證成我們社會剝奪犯法者生命的權利，死刑的完整證立還需要證成政治權威有資格行使這個權利。我以約瑟夫‧拉茲（Joseph Raz）對政治權威的解釋為基礎，提出一些我的批評和補正，論證死刑的政治權威對近代個人難以證立。根據拉茲，政治權威蘊含了以下主張：國家權威的從屬者有「完整的」服從政治權威的義務，從屬者不能因為不認同法院的判決，就拒絕當事人服從法院判決的義務。我進一步分析，這個政治權威特性蘊含了權威的建立需要通過「異議檢驗」：當從屬者和權威的判斷發生異議時，從屬者必須有充分理由繼續認可權威，權威的正當性才能持續建立。我主張近代個人主義因為高度重視和自保相關的個人自主性領域，因此我們沒有理由在對法院判決有異議時，壓抑個人自主性，繼續認可我們服從死刑判決的義務。死刑的政治權威無法通過「異議檢驗」，因此難以證立。

The essay suggests that even after we, as a society of individuals, successfully justify our ethical right to deprive an offender's life, a complete account of the death penalty nevertheless entails a further justification that the state's authority is entitled to exercise such right. Based on a revised account of political authority originally defended by Joseph Raz, I argue that modern individuals shall find themselves unable to acknowledge the political authority of the death penalty. The concept of political authority implies what I call ＂the dissent test＂, which states that a political authority continues to be justified, if and only if, whenever the subjects dissent from its directives, they shall find sufficient reasons to acknowledge the authority. I further argue that modern individuals demand a significant and unusual degree of autonomy in the spheres related to their self-preservation. Hence it follows that whenever we disagree with the court's decision of a death sentence, we find little reason to suppress our autonomy and therefore are unable to acknowledge our obligation to obey. The political authority of the death penalty fails the ＂dissent test＂ and thus cannot be justified.