股份有限公司之董事「分年改選」（「任期交錯制」）係美國法制明文規定且行之有年之制度，我國公司法則未明文規定容許或限制，因此於我國法制下之容許性不免引發疑義。經濟部曾以2011年3月24日經商字第10002406370號函釋，以公司法第203條、第201 條為由，否定董事分年改選之適法性。本文則從美國伊利諾州最高法院於1955年、俄亥俄州最高法院於1956年兩則案例，及德拉瓦州公司法第141條(d)、(K)(1)之規定及美國律師協會訂定之模範商業公司法第8.06條等規定出發探討，可見董事任期交錯制會降低累積投票制之影響程度，常被拿來作為延續董事會政策之利器，及削弱少數股東代表性、破壞累積投票制之工具，且使得欲透過委託書徵求或併購取得公司經營權之計畫難以實現，從此角度來看，對股東利益或公司價值較為不利，故美國法對於分年改選此一弊端有其配套措施，避免多數股東完全驅逐少數股東選出之董事。而我國公司法第192條第1項、第195條第1項、第198條第1項及第201條之規定，使經股東會決議選出之全體董事其任期固定，中途遭解任者所留空缺亦與任期屆至解任者同進退，且董事係以累積投票制選出，公司大股東無法變更章程為全額連記法。倘容許分年改選，將與上開規定形成之法律秩序相違背，且依我國公司法第199條之規定，股東會得隨時以特別決議不附理由解任董事，毫無關於分年改選之配套措施，可見分年改選之制度應非立法者所預見。是以，本文認為較經濟部函釋更有力之說明理由，應在於此項制度之存在將削弱累積投票制而違反整體法律秩序。又我國公司法並無如大法官、公平交易委員會、國家通訊傳播委員會有任期交錯之制度明文規定，公司之私法人本質亦難比擬上開行政機關，自難以容許此項制度之存在。從而，股東會如決議將董事或監察人分年改選訂入章程，應認違反法令規定而無效，股東得依民事訴訟法第247條第1項、公司法第191條之規定，據以提起確認訴訟，請求確認上開決議內容自始、當然、確定無效。

The dispute of the legitimacy of the staggered board, which is denied by Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. 2011, while recognized by all states in the United States, remains unsettled in Taiwan. The purpose of a staggered board in the United States statutes, for example, Delaware General Corporation Law section 141 and MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT section 8.06, has been to assure the continuity and stability of the corporation’s business strategies and policies as determined by the board. However, it also undermines “cumulative voting system” since a greater number of votes is required to elect a director if the board is staggered than is required if the entire board is elected at each annual meeting. In other words, staggering the board dilutes, and might even prevent, minority representation. Taiwan’s Corporate Law section 192 paragraph 1, 195 paragraph 1, 198 paragraph 1, and 201 frame the legal structure that directors of boards are elected in a mandatory “cumulative voting system,” dispersing the power to elect directors among shareholders, instead of concentrating the power, as is often the case with straight voting, and running out of terms of office at the same time. Besides, a director may be removed without cause under section 199, with no coordinated sets of measures of staggered board. On the contrary, those institutions, for example, Justices of the Constitutional Court, Fair Trade Commission, and National Communication Commission, composed of staggered membership are based on the explicit organic statutes stipulating the number of classes, the terms, and legislative purposes. Therefore, those sections in Taiwan’s Corporate Law mentioned above are distinct and no inference that the staggered board is legitimate can be drawn from their silence on the dispute over staggered board issue. The resolution in the shareholders’ meeting of enacting the staggered board provision in the certification of incorporation is predicted to be announced invalidation by civil court according to Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure section 247 paragraph 1 and Corporate Law section 191 after the lawsuit initiated by shareholders.