資料載入處理中...
臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統
:::
網站導覽
國圖首頁
聯絡我們
操作說明
English
行動版
(18.216.201.32)
登入
字型:
**字體大小變更功能,需開啟瀏覽器的JAVASCRIPT,如您的瀏覽器不支援,
IE6請利用鍵盤按住ALT鍵 + V → X → (G)最大(L)較大(M)中(S)較小(A)小,來選擇適合您的文字大小,
如為IE7以上、Firefoxy或Chrome瀏覽器則可利用鍵盤 Ctrl + (+)放大 (-)縮小來改變字型大小。
來源文獻查詢
引文查詢
瀏覽查詢
作者權威檔
引用/點閱統計
我的研究室
資料庫說明
相關網站
來源文獻查詢
/
簡易查詢
/
查詢結果列表
/
詳目列表
:::
詳目顯示
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆
/1
頁
來源文獻資料
摘要
外文摘要
引文資料
題名:
The Effect of Outside Employment Opportunities on Executive Stock Options
書刊名:
會計審計論叢
作者:
林宜勉
/
簡秀芳
作者(外文):
Lin, Yi-mien
/
Chien, Hsiu-fang
出版日期:
2015
卷期:
5:2
頁次:
頁57-86
主題關鍵詞:
外部聘僱機會
;
股票選擇權
;
經理人異動
;
經理人技能
;
運氣
;
產業景氣
;
Outside employment opportunity
;
Stock options
;
Executive's turnover
;
Executives' skills
;
Luck
原始連結:
連回原系統網址
相關次數:
被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
排除自我引用:0
共同引用:0
點閱:11
本文檢視高階經理人外部聘僱機會和高階經理人的技能及公司績效之間的關係,同時探討高階經理人薪酬在不同市場景氣狀況的結果。本研究的貢獻在於了解高階經理人的運氣及技能如何影響他們做離職或留職的決定及股票選擇權的策略。實證結果發現,愈有經驗且對公司有愈多專業貢獻的高階經理人愈少被裁員或自願離職,高階經理人的離職和運氣(產業景氣)無關。同時,高階經理人有較高的專業經驗可以得到較高的薪酬,但年紀較大則否。經理人的運氣和薪酬無關,顯示出專業技能為影響薪酬最重要的因素。經營績效較差的高階經理人得到較少的薪酬,此時,高階經理人也較容易操作盈餘管理。
以文找文
This paper examines the relationship between executives' outside employment opportunities and executive skills or firm performance, and looks at the effect of executive employment compensation on different market conditions. Our contribution is to discover how executives' luck and skill affect their leave-or-stay decisions and their options in exercising strategies. We find that experienced executives and those with greater professional affiliation with firms are less likely to be fired or sent on voluntary leave, and that executive leave is unrelated to luck. Moreover, we find that executives with more professional experience can obtain greater compensation, but that this compensation is not necessarily acquired by older executives. Executives with a poor operating performance relative to other firms in the same industry obtain less compensation. There is no relationship between an executive's luck and compensation; we find that an executive's skill is the most important factor influencing compensation. Furthermore, executives are more likely to perform earnings management to grant stock options under bad luck or poor operating performance.
以文找文
期刊論文
1.
Lee, T. H.、Gerhart, B.、Weller, I.、Trevor, C. O.(2008)。Understanding voluntary turnover: Path-specific job satisfaction effects and the importance of unsolicited job offers。Academy of Management Journal,51(4),651-671。
2.
Rajgopal, S.、Shevlin, T.、Zamora, V.(2006)。CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts。The Journal of Finance,61(4),1813-1844。
3.
Aggarwal, R. K.、Samwick, A. A.(1999)。Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence。The Journal of Finance,54(6),1999-2043。
4.
Bizjak, John M.、Lemmon, Michael L.、Naveen, Lalitha(2008)。Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?。Journal of Financial Economics,90(2),152-168。
5.
Bettis, C.、Bizjak, J.、Coles, J.、Kalpathy, S.(2010)。Stock and option grants with performance-based vesting provisions。The Review of Financial Studies,23(10),3849-3888。
6.
Brookman, J. T.、Thistle, P. D.(2013)。Managerial compensation: Luck, skill or labor markets。Journal of Corporate Finance,21,252-268。
7.
Fee, C. E.、Hadlock, C. J.(2003)。Raids, rewards, and reputations in the market for managerial talent。The Review of Financial Studies,16(4),1315-1357。
8.
Hall, B. J.(1999)。The design of multi-year stock option plans。Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,12(2),97-106。
9.
Graham, J. R.、Li, S.、Qiu, J.(2012)。Managerial attributes and executive compensation。The Review of Financial Studies,25(1),144-186。
10.
Gopalan, R.、Milbourn, T.、Song, F.(2010)。Strategic flexibility and the optimality of pay for sector performance。The Review of Financial Studies,23(5),2060-2098。
11.
Rappaport, A.(1999)。New thinking on how to link executive pay with performance?。Harvard Business Review,77(2),91-101。
12.
Bizjak, J.、Lemmon, M. L.、Nguyen, T.(2011)。Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design。Journal of Financial Economics,100(3),538-555。
13.
Bertrand, M.、Mullainathan, S.(2001)。Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are。The Quarterly Journal of Economics,116(3),901-932。
14.
Celentani, M.、Loveira, R.(2006)。A simple explanation of the relative performance evaluation puzzle。Review of Economic Dynamics,9(3),525-540。
15.
Goyal, Vidhan K.、Park, Chul W.(2002)。Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover。Journal of Corporate Finance,8(1),49-66。
16.
Brick, Ivan E.、Palmon, Oded、Wald, John K.(2006)。CEO compensation, director compensation and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?。Journal of Corporate Finance,12(3),403-423。
17.
Garvey, G. T.、Milbourn, T. T.(2006)。Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad。Journal of Financial Economics,82(1),197-225。
18.
Bergstresser, Daniel、Philippon, Thomas(2006)。CEO incentives and earnings management。Journal of Financial Economics,80(3),511-529。
19.
Beneish, M. D.(1999)。Incentives and Penalties Related to Earnings Overstatements That Violate GAAP。The Accounting Review,74(4),425-457。
20.
Bebchuk, L. A.、Fried, J. M.(2003)。Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem。Journal of Economic Perspectives,17(3),71-92。
21.
Oyer, P.(2004)。Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?。Journal of Finance,59(4),1619-1649。
22.
Kothari, Sagar P.、Leone, Andrew J.、Wasley, Charles E.(2005)。Performance matched discretionary accrual measures。Journal of Accounting and Economics,39(1),163-197。
23.
Healy, Paul M.(1985)。The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions。Journal of Accounting and Economics,7(1-3),85-107。
24.
Defond, Mark L.、Park, Chul W.(1999)。The Effect of Competition on CEO Turnover。Journal of Accounting and Economics,27(1),35-56。
25.
Brickley, James A.、Linck, James S.、Coles, Jeffrey L.(1999)。What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives。Journal of Financial Economics,52(3),341-377。
26.
Dechow, Patricia M.、Sloan, Richard G.、Sweeney, Amy P.(1996)。Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC。Contemporary Accounting Research,13(1),1-36。
研究報告
1.
Coles, J. L.、Li, Z. F.(2013)。An empirical assessment of empirical corporate finance。Arizona State University。
2.
Francis, B. B.、Hasan, I.、John, K.、Sharma, Z.(2009)。The bright side of asymmetric benchmarking: Evidence from top management team pay。New York University。
3.
Dirk, J.、Fadi, K.(2008)。CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation。Stanford University Graduate School of Business。
4.
Murphy, Kevin J.、Zabojnik, Jan(2007)。Managerial capital and the market for CEOs。Queen's University。
5.
Himmelberg, C. P.、Hubbard, R. G.(2000)。Incentive pay and the market for CEOs: An analysis of pay-for-performance sensitivity。Columbia University。
其他
1.
Bebchuk, L.,Cremers, M.,Peyer, U.(2007)。Pay distribution in the top executive team(574)。
推文
當script無法執行時可按︰
推文
推薦
當script無法執行時可按︰
推薦
引用網址
當script無法執行時可按︰
引用網址
引用嵌入語法
當script無法執行時可按︰
引用嵌入語法
轉寄
當script無法執行時可按︰
轉寄
top
:::
相關期刊
相關論文
相關專書
相關著作
熱門點閱
無相關期刊論文
無相關博士論文
無相關書籍
無相關著作
1.
The Effects of Different Exercise Training Programs on Cognitive Performance: A Stroop Test Study
2.
2014年世界盃柔道錦標賽技術分析
3.
發展基植於人格特質的桌球技戰術前三板分析模型
4.
頂尖網球選手發球優勢與發球落點之性別差異研究
5.
德國拜仁慕尼黑職業足球隊進入禁區之性能分析
6.
電腦輔助系統對排球裁判執法判決之影響
7.
二週外在負重訓練對鞍馬併腿全旋運動學表現的影響
8.
臺灣與亞運會男子競技體操選手表現之比較--以2014年亞運會為例
9.
8週全身振動訓練對青年男子手球選手球速、移位速度與跳躍能力之影響
10.
軟組織治療對罹患盂肱關節內旋活動度缺損之棒球投手投擲表現的影響
11.
大專跆拳選手運動傷害與防護之分析
12.
線上閱讀素養構念之性別恆等性分析
13.
國民小學高年級學童校園霸凌現況之研究
14.
Bandura道德疏離機制量表對於國內中小學學生適切性之探究
15.
國小行政教師與其主管的關係品質對主管信任與承諾之影響:心理契約與角色衝突的中介效果
QR Code