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題名:The Effect of Outside Employment Opportunities on Executive Stock Options
書刊名:會計審計論叢
作者:林宜勉 引用關係簡秀芳
作者(外文):Lin, Yi-mienChien, Hsiu-fang
出版日期:2015
卷期:5:2
頁次:頁57-86
主題關鍵詞:外部聘僱機會股票選擇權經理人異動經理人技能運氣產業景氣Outside employment opportunityStock optionsExecutive's turnoverExecutives' skillsLuck
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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本文檢視高階經理人外部聘僱機會和高階經理人的技能及公司績效之間的關係,同時探討高階經理人薪酬在不同市場景氣狀況的結果。本研究的貢獻在於了解高階經理人的運氣及技能如何影響他們做離職或留職的決定及股票選擇權的策略。實證結果發現,愈有經驗且對公司有愈多專業貢獻的高階經理人愈少被裁員或自願離職,高階經理人的離職和運氣(產業景氣)無關。同時,高階經理人有較高的專業經驗可以得到較高的薪酬,但年紀較大則否。經理人的運氣和薪酬無關,顯示出專業技能為影響薪酬最重要的因素。經營績效較差的高階經理人得到較少的薪酬,此時,高階經理人也較容易操作盈餘管理。
This paper examines the relationship between executives' outside employment opportunities and executive skills or firm performance, and looks at the effect of executive employment compensation on different market conditions. Our contribution is to discover how executives' luck and skill affect their leave-or-stay decisions and their options in exercising strategies. We find that experienced executives and those with greater professional affiliation with firms are less likely to be fired or sent on voluntary leave, and that executive leave is unrelated to luck. Moreover, we find that executives with more professional experience can obtain greater compensation, but that this compensation is not necessarily acquired by older executives. Executives with a poor operating performance relative to other firms in the same industry obtain less compensation. There is no relationship between an executive's luck and compensation; we find that an executive's skill is the most important factor influencing compensation. Furthermore, executives are more likely to perform earnings management to grant stock options under bad luck or poor operating performance.
期刊論文
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2.Rajgopal, S.、Shevlin, T.、Zamora, V.(2006)。CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts。The Journal of Finance,61(4),1813-1844。  new window
3.Aggarwal, R. K.、Samwick, A. A.(1999)。Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence。The Journal of Finance,54(6),1999-2043。  new window
4.Bizjak, John M.、Lemmon, Michael L.、Naveen, Lalitha(2008)。Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?。Journal of Financial Economics,90(2),152-168。  new window
5.Bettis, C.、Bizjak, J.、Coles, J.、Kalpathy, S.(2010)。Stock and option grants with performance-based vesting provisions。The Review of Financial Studies,23(10),3849-3888。  new window
6.Brookman, J. T.、Thistle, P. D.(2013)。Managerial compensation: Luck, skill or labor markets。Journal of Corporate Finance,21,252-268。  new window
7.Fee, C. E.、Hadlock, C. J.(2003)。Raids, rewards, and reputations in the market for managerial talent。The Review of Financial Studies,16(4),1315-1357。  new window
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12.Bizjak, J.、Lemmon, M. L.、Nguyen, T.(2011)。Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design。Journal of Financial Economics,100(3),538-555。  new window
13.Bertrand, M.、Mullainathan, S.(2001)。Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are。The Quarterly Journal of Economics,116(3),901-932。  new window
14.Celentani, M.、Loveira, R.(2006)。A simple explanation of the relative performance evaluation puzzle。Review of Economic Dynamics,9(3),525-540。  new window
15.Goyal, Vidhan K.、Park, Chul W.(2002)。Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover。Journal of Corporate Finance,8(1),49-66。  new window
16.Brick, Ivan E.、Palmon, Oded、Wald, John K.(2006)。CEO compensation, director compensation and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?。Journal of Corporate Finance,12(3),403-423。  new window
17.Garvey, G. T.、Milbourn, T. T.(2006)。Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad。Journal of Financial Economics,82(1),197-225。  new window
18.Bergstresser, Daniel、Philippon, Thomas(2006)。CEO incentives and earnings management。Journal of Financial Economics,80(3),511-529。  new window
19.Beneish, M. D.(1999)。Incentives and Penalties Related to Earnings Overstatements That Violate GAAP。The Accounting Review,74(4),425-457。  new window
20.Bebchuk, L. A.、Fried, J. M.(2003)。Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem。Journal of Economic Perspectives,17(3),71-92。  new window
21.Oyer, P.(2004)。Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?。Journal of Finance,59(4),1619-1649。  new window
22.Kothari, Sagar P.、Leone, Andrew J.、Wasley, Charles E.(2005)。Performance matched discretionary accrual measures。Journal of Accounting and Economics,39(1),163-197。  new window
23.Healy, Paul M.(1985)。The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions。Journal of Accounting and Economics,7(1-3),85-107。  new window
24.Defond, Mark L.、Park, Chul W.(1999)。The Effect of Competition on CEO Turnover。Journal of Accounting and Economics,27(1),35-56。  new window
25.Brickley, James A.、Linck, James S.、Coles, Jeffrey L.(1999)。What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives。Journal of Financial Economics,52(3),341-377。  new window
26.Dechow, Patricia M.、Sloan, Richard G.、Sweeney, Amy P.(1996)。Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC。Contemporary Accounting Research,13(1),1-36。  new window
研究報告
1.Coles, J. L.、Li, Z. F.(2013)。An empirical assessment of empirical corporate finance。Arizona State University。  new window
2.Francis, B. B.、Hasan, I.、John, K.、Sharma, Z.(2009)。The bright side of asymmetric benchmarking: Evidence from top management team pay。New York University。  new window
3.Dirk, J.、Fadi, K.(2008)。CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation。Stanford University Graduate School of Business。  new window
4.Murphy, Kevin J.、Zabojnik, Jan(2007)。Managerial capital and the market for CEOs。Queen's University。  new window
5.Himmelberg, C. P.、Hubbard, R. G.(2000)。Incentive pay and the market for CEOs: An analysis of pay-for-performance sensitivity。Columbia University。  new window
其他
1.Bebchuk, L.,Cremers, M.,Peyer, U.(2007)。Pay distribution in the top executive team(574)。  new window
 
 
 
 
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