本文有兩項意圖。首先，闡明康德的根本惡說，並指出此說與其意志概念無法協調一致。如果康德堅持人性具有人力所無法根除的根本惡，則很難同時堅持作為實踐理性的意志具有完全的自由，並能克服惡而回歸善。再者，康德的根本惡說其實隱然意謂著一種無法為人所掌握與理解的先在之惡，也就是奧古 斯丁的原罪概念所象徵地指謂者；究極言之，根本惡說乃是延續傳統基督教有關惡之言說的一種哲學表述。果如此，則回歸善的盼望就不只是一項道德任務，更是一宗教或信仰任務；唯藉由超越的援助，我們始能完全棄惡就善。

This essay has two intentions. First, to explore Kant's doctrine of radical evil and thereby to demonstrate that his doctrine cannot be consistent with his conception of the will. If Kant argues that there is a radical evil in human nature which is ineradicable by human powers, then it is difficult at the same time to insist that the will as practical reason is perfectly free and therefore would overcome evil to return to the good. Secondly, in fact, Kant's radical evil implicitly signifies the-evil-already-there which we can not comprehend and understand, namely, what Augustine's original sin signifies symbolically; thus ultimately speaking, Kant's doctrine of radical evil is a kind of philosophical expression continuing the Christian discourses of evil. If so, to return to the good then it is not only a moral hope but also a religious one, because this hope as Kant proclaimed is possible only through a transcendent help.