The constitution of the R.O.C. creates a half direct democracy by mixing the elements of direct and indirect democracy. The people, however, are not able to claim their rights to initiative and referendum until the Citizen Lawmaking Act (CLA) was passed at the end of 2003. This essay will examine the institutional arrangements of this new law in the spirit of half direct democracy. According to the principle of popular sovereignty, the people may request a vote on the transfer or change of the state's sovereignty, whether it is enshrined in the constitution or not. When the state's sovereignty remains unchanged, making a new constitution involves rewriting the social contract (i.e. the constitution). It should therefore be submitted to the vote of the people in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the new constitution. The effective constitution does not prohibit the people from revising the constitution by way of initiative and referendum. The CLA merely provides an initiative in the form of a general suggestion to make a new law, and its application is quite dubious. As far as the citizen is called on to vote on public policy, the effect of such a vote is difficult to determine. The contentious "defensive referendum" is commensurable with the spirit of the constitution, which empowers the president to make fundamental decisions in matters of national security. It is contrary to the principle of separation of powers, as the Legislative Yuan may ask the people to vote on drafts. It is of some concern that the many thresholds installed in the CLA may alienate the spirit of half direct democracy. The Referendum Examination Commission encroaches the president's constitutional right to nominate all executive personnel.