本文以1947-1951年間，美國在西部中國邊疆少數民族地區的反共佈局與政治、軍事活動為題，擬提出兩個向來被忽略的論點：第一，本研究擬重新審思西方學界向來所主張，華府軍政高層直接介入中國邊疆事務，以及其對邊疆地區少數民族勢力所進行的秘密援助行動，始於1950年代初期美國援助西藏以抵禦中共解放軍的進犯。本文指出，美國對於中國邊疆事務的直接關注與秘密援助方案的提出，既非始於1950年代初期，最初亦非以西藏或藏族為首要對象。早在二次大戰結束不久的1947年，美、蘇冷戰對抗格局儼然已成型之際，不論是美國軍方情報單位或是國務院外交部門，即開始對中亞與中國邊疆地區的戰略安全，產生了高度的興趣，並且在中共政權於1949年10月1日正式建立之前，即已將其對中國邊疆地區的關注與興趣，轉化為對中國西北內陸各少數民族反共團體的具體援助行動。更甚者，如同本文將討論的，1950年代，美國對西藏問題的直接介入，事實上是華府自1940年代晚期以來，為因應冷戰需要而在中國西部邊陲地區所進行一連串軍、政佈局下的最後一環。第二，本文也欲對傳統學界有關二次大戰後美國對華政策之研究，提出一個不同面向的觀察。過去中外學界較少注意到的一個史實是，國共內戰晚期，當華府準備「放棄」國民政府的同時，另一方面卻鼓勵持反共立場、並依然效忠國民政府的西部中國邊疆省份與少數民族團體，以建立「區域性反共政權」的方式，來阻止或拖延共軍部隊對這些地區的「解放」，並期待共產黨操控下的中國，在不久的將來能有所轉變。回顧歷史，美國自1940年代晚期起對中國西部邊陲地帶的戰略思維與行動，因中國內部情勢的急遽轉變，以及未有充裕的時間實踐，而顯得極為倉促與不成熟，而這些秘密活動最終亦未能夠扭轉共產黨勢力在該地區蔓延的事實。然而其所造成的影響，卻值得吾人仔細探究：美國於1940年代晚期對中國西部邊疆地區少數民族團體的支持承諾與秘密援助，在1950年代依然持續鼓舞著這些地區的零星反共活動，並成為1960年代冷戰高峰時期流行於世界各地之美、蘇「代理戰爭」(proxy war) 的最早案例之一。

This article focuses on the covert anti-Communist activities of the United States in the borderlands of western China between 1947 and 1951, when the Americans secretly attempted to support various local non-Han Chinese minorities to unite to form regional bloc to resist Communist penetration into these border regions. Though these attempts proved unsuccessful, they do show, contrary to much earlier work on the subject, that directly American intervention in China’s border affairs was not launched in the early 1950s in Tibet. Rather, as early as 1947 as the Cold War was just erupting, with a view to counteracting Soviet activities in Central Asia, high authorities in the U.S. government began to pay serious attention to the strategically significant border areas of western China. Even before the official inauguration of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, the U.S. had already formulated a new policy to further its strategic concerns over western China's border regions: substantial aid to local anti-Communist minority groups. The U.S. hoped this would help delay the Communist “liberation” of China's peripheral regions. 　　The U.S. covert missions in western China eventually failed, due to time constraints and the unexpectedly rapid collapse of the Nationalist government. However, the effect of these clandestine interactions with Inner Asian peoples deserves careful reconsideration. Indeed, the U.S. promises to support non-Han Chinese minorities against the CCP regime continued to inspire these peoples' anti-Communist movements in the 1950s. In addition, the U.S. intention to use the minority groups of western China against the Communists in the late 1940s was one of the earliest examples of what was to become the “proxy wars” that became prevalent throughout the Cold War.