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題名：核心代理問題與董監自利行為、研發效率之關聯性
作者：陳振傑
作者(外文)：Chen, Chenchieh
校院名稱：國立中正大學
系所名稱：財務金融研究所
指導教授：王元章
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2011
主題關鍵詞：核心代理問題；董監自利行為；研發效率；Core Agency Problem；Director and Supervisor’s Self-interest Behavior；R&D Efficiency
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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本研究之目的在探討核心代理問題與董監自利行為之間的關係。本文發現董監持股比率愈低、信用評等愈差、控制股東現金流量請求權愈低、或控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度愈高之公司，其董監事的自利程度與自利行為發生之機率也會愈高。此外，被控制股東所完全掌控的公司也有較高的董監自利程度，而外部董監席次比率愈低之公司，因其代理問題或監督機制的不完善，導致其董監自利行為之發生機率也會愈高。國內企業因具特殊的股權結構，易導致董監自利行為的發生，本研究結果將可協助釐清核心代理問題與董監自利行為之間的關係。
本研究之目的在探討核心代理問題、研發效率與企業未來報酬及風險之關係。首先，本文發現高研發效率公司之研發創新活動能增加公司未來三期的報酬，卻不會增加未來三期的營運風險。但是，低研發效率公司之研發創新活動並不能增加公司未來的報酬，反而會導致公司未來有較高的營運風險。因此，投資人可以使用研發效率評斷研發創新活動的成效。接下來本研究將進一步探討核心代理問題與研發效率之間的關係。本文發現研發效率與核心代理問題具有顯著的負向關係。最後，由核心代理問題變數與研發創新的交乘項發現，核心代理問題不僅會降低公司的研發效率，進而會使公司的研發創新活動產生較低的報酬及較高的風險。
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the core agency problems and self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors. We find that companies with higher degree and probability of self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors are usually characterized by the weak corporate governance mechanism, lower cash flow rights or greater separation between the control rights and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders. In addition, the companies fully controlled by the controlling shareholders also have a higher degree of self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors. The companies with low outside directors and supervisors, due to core agency problem and weak corporate governance mechanism, are more likely to have self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors. On account of the unique ownership structure of Taiwanese companies, it is not hard to observe the self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors. The findings of this study may help us better understand the relationship between the core agency problems and the self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship of core agency problem, R&D efficiency and future return and risk. First, we find that the innovation activities of firm with different R&D efficiency will produce different effects of future return and operational risk. Therefore, investors may use R&D efficiency to assess the performance of innovation activities. Then, this study will further explore the relationship between the core agency problems and R&D efficiency. We find that R&D efficiency is significantly and negatively related to the core agency problem. Finally, we find that core agency problem could lower R&D efficiency and in turn affect innovation activities will produce lower return and higher risk by using the interaction variable of core agency problem and innovation activities.
主題一：核心代理問題與董監自利行為之關聯性
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主題二：核心代理問題、研發效率以及企業之報酬與風險
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