本文所要探討的主要命題是，既然地方政府間的合作能夠發揮資源的綜效作用，並且有利於合作的兩方或多方，為什麼地方政府間不願意合作？或未採取具體而充分的合作行動？本文嘗試從新制度經濟學的制度概念途徑出發，探討目前臺灣地方政府間發展夥伴關係的制度障礙，並且引介其他先進工業化國家在區域治理方面的制度創新經驗，最後則進一步討論臺灣地方政府間發展夥伴關係的制度變革機會。本文發現，在正式規則方面，臺灣目前的相關法制條件，顯然不足以提供地方政府間發展夥伴關係的誘因力量；其次，在非正式規則方面，地方政府間出現的本位主義和政黨競爭或衝突，均不利於彼此發展合作關係；再者，在執行的層面上，地方政府間存在明顯的能力及資源落差，此種情況將引發弱方審慎考慮治理成本的問題。本文最後，係從降低交易成本的制度設計觀點，提出以行政法人作為區域治理新機制之建議。

This paper aims to answer the question, “If establishing close partnerships among local governments can create common interests, why do local governments not establish such parternships?” Following from this question, this paper attempts to use the institutional approach of new institutional economics to analyze the obstacles and opportunities for the establishment of partnerships among local governments in Taiwan. This study finds that the laws of regional governance do not provide institutional incentives for local governments to form partnerships. When considering informal rules, the study finds that each local government’s selfish departmentalism and local political conflicts put them at a disadvantage in collaborating with one another. In regard to the enforcement of rules, the study finds that the gap in governing capacity or resources among different governments can influence the weaker ones to refuse to collaborate with others that can cause them to lose their autonomy. Finally, based on the lessons from foreign cases and the transaction costs in the institutional design, the author suggests that the administrative corporation could be a bold new institution of regional governance in Taiwan.