隨著唐宋變革時期貨幣經濟高漲而確立的商稅制度，是當時統治者嘗試對流通商品收稅的突出現象，也為探討傳統中國政府和市場關係提供了重要材料。中國宋史學界對此的主流解釋仍受馬克思主義史觀的影響，將宋代商稅、明代鈔關和晚清釐金之前後出現，視為對應商品經濟演進而產生的從低級到高級的一個完整發展序列，忽略了國家作為徵稅主體所起的主動作用，也因此多將宋朝包括商稅在內的間接稅視為苛稅。本文利用晚清釐金制度與北宋商稅制度比較來測試這一假說，結果不能成立。而傳統中國社會內部市場發展和國家財政之關係，也遠較學者想像的複雜。 以商稅為代表的宋代間接稅制度之確立，意味著一種新型的國家與市場關係開始出現在中國歷史上，在世界史上也是前所未見。商稅中的住稅（銷售稅）以城市消費為背景，過稅（流轉稅）則是以流通商品為對象，尤其針對長途貿易的物品。從制度比較和數據分析上看，北宋商稅和晚清釐金極為相似，通過比較就會發現以市場為基礎的稅收制度，確實有必要建立一個全國性的監管網路，輔之以組織和技術方面的手段。

The mainstream studies in mainland China often accuse the Song financial administration of excessive taxation, which is thought to buttress growth in trade. The Marxist historians also emphasize a corresponding relationship between trade and commercial taxation and identify the sixteenth century as the turning point for both an unprecedented expansion of the market and in consequence a substantial transformation of the taxation, especially how commerce was taxed. This paper challenges such a view by comparing the commercial tax collection in the eleventh century with the likin taxes in the late Qing period (1840-1911), both are well-known for collecting revenues by levying goods in circulation. The data-based comparison reveals a striking similarity between the two systems. From an institutional perspective, the accusation against the Song commercial taxes can be hardly accepted, even at face value, if we bring the likin into the comparison. As the late Qing state thirstily attempted to expand the tax basis by adopting the likin tax, it antagonized the public severely. Yet there is a consensus among historians of modern China that this adoption means an essential step “‘on the road to success’ for China’s modern state-builders.” What is underneath the formation of the two indirect-tax-based regimes is the financial crisis both had to face from time to time. The total of the Qing tax revenues tripled from 1753 through 1908. Meanwhile, the land tax, which at the peak of Qing prosperity yielded two-thirds of state revenues, shrunk to one-third, and all taxes from non-agricultural sectors contributed two-thirds. As clearly presented in both the Song and the late Qing histories, the financial crises caused by escalations in the military expenditures often produced the need for innovations in the financial systems. Not the likin alone, but the entire story of the late Qing financial reforms helps to highlight the infrastructural power of the Song state. Pressed by demands from the commercialized, capital-intensive warfare, the late Qing government took a much shorter period (only a half century if one counts the onset of the reform from the Taiping rebellion) to accomplish a similar tax state than did the ruling elite during the Tang-Song transition. Yet in comparison to the short-lived late Qing financial system, which was abruptly thrown away by the revolution, the Song tax mechanism lasted for over three centuries until the Mongol conquest , a length which was by no means ephemeral.