The fact that the Chinese philosophy is becoming more and more prominent makes a lot of scholars start to resuscitate it. The purpose of this paper intends to look at this fact from a methodological point of view. We support the resuscitation, but we also think strategically we should examine things in perspectives by taking into account both the particularity and universality of the Chinese philosophy. Without doing this, the Chinese philosophy remains a subject of local learning which cannot exert its utility of promoting the progress of world learning. For this reason, the paper’s focus will be on methodological arguments in order to achieve the far-reaching goal of making the study of Chinese philosophy a scientific subject. We therefore take the example of the debates between T. Kuhn and K. Popper in 1970s to demonstrate a new approach concerning our objective. Kuhn’s theory of paradigms and Popper’s theory of falsification offer us two approaches of thinking how to make the study of Chinese philosophy transform itself and become scientific. To this regard, the historical debates between “Chin” (親) and “Hsin” (新) exemplify a concrete instance for us to understand how to bring modern interpretation to the understanding of a piece of ancient texts. Finally, this paper takes E. Levinas’ interpretation of Talmud as a model to manifest what we are likely to do in interpreting ancient texts. Levinas’ methods of demythologization, of ethical basis and of encouraging debates are efficient ways of shifting the reception of the Jewish Talmud to its modern version of far-reaching philosophy. We at end of this paper conclude that the study of Chinese philosophy should follow this methodological track in order to make it a new subject of the modern age.