本文以競局理論模型，透過連續均衡概念，發現唯有當決策者提供資源的成本位
於適當區間的情況下，決策者的策略性表態，才具有完全的訊號作用。而且，當國民黨提名
導致派系雙雙投入選戰之機率，大於國民黨開放導致派系雙雙投入選戰之機率時，國民黨反
而會採提名的策略。顯示派系皆投入選戰，並非國民黨所不樂見的局面。因此，派系輪政只
是國民黨維持兩派系均衡工具而已。當排戰慣例之派系力量越大，國民黨越可能扶持「應該
輪到執政」的派系，而當挑戰慣例之派系力量不大時，國民黨反而會以開放之策略，讓「應
該輪到執政」的派系倍感威脅。

　　　　　In this manuscript, the author models the recent history of relations
between the ruling Kuomintang (KMT, or the Nationalist Party) and its local
factions an an example of a "three-persons, sequential, incomplete information
game". By utilizing the solution concept of "sequential equilibrium" it is
demonstrated that the KMT is constrained in the use of "signaling" as its
strategy to dominate factions in local politics. However, strategic signaling
can be most powerful when the "election cost" to the KMT is perceived to be
within a certain range. In this case, the KMT has its best opportunity to
manipulate local factions such that the KMT's political dominance can be
preserved through the wellknown phenomenon of "faction alternation" in Taiwan's
local politics.