戰後初期，臺灣國有林經營面臨植伐失衡與保林難以落實的危機，荒廢林地曾達一百萬公頃。對此，「林政與林產分合不定」是被接受的解釋。本文首先質疑此類解釋，進而以規範國有林伐的制度為焦點，探討制度的互動與聯結關係。藉此，作者提出替代的解釋架構，並闡明當時臺灣森林環境與社經變遷的關係。 依經營都屬性區分，戰後園林伐採制度可分為官營與民營兩種，其源頭可追溯至日治時代。一九四五年，臺灣回歸中華民國，林務局—後於一九四七年為林產管理局取代—接收了原由臺灣總督府與日本資本家營的高價值、高蓄積針葉林區，將其分為六個官營林場經營，獨佔島內大部份之原木市場。是故，民營伐木業的情況與日治時期相似，其施業被限制在闊葉林區，受林政部門管轄。但薪炭材市場卻幾為這些業者獨佔。 戰後初期，社會對於枕木、原木與薪炭材的需求高漲，林產管理局身為主要的木材供給?，因其高昂的運作成本，提供材種的單調與經營無效率，難以滿足此些多樣且緊急的需求。因此，配售制的設計被用來減輕此緊迫狀況。但此制度的運作受到嚴重通貨膨脹、市場多重結構與軍方無止盡需求等衝擊，導致官營林場的運作極為窘迫。在此脈絡下，從一方面而言，政府不但承認且延續民營業者於日治時期取得的伐木許哥，並以新制強化其特殊地位，目的在於整合業者之達成曾產目標、增進國家收益，彌補配售制導致的虧損且供為造林費用。但另一方面，此聯結卻意外地增進民營業者的資本積累，榨取民間經濟剩餘以支撐公營業與軍事時關的生產及再生產活動。不僅如此，政府的造林能力遭到減弱，高昂的原木與薪炭材價引發了盜伐；民營為官營伐木的施業亦常為森林破壞之主因。因此，臺遇的社會與森林環境，均為戰後混亂的重整付出代價。

In the early post-war period, Taiwan’s national forest management faced a crisis of the “imbalance between reforestation and lumbering” with forest protection often not being realized. The area of idle woodlands had been about one million hectares. For this situation, “the ambiguousness of forest administration and production” was the explanation wildly accepted. This article first challenges the explanation, then focuses on the institutions regulating lumbering in the national forests, and investigates their interactions and articulations. The author also provides and alternative explanatory framework and uncovers the relationships within the forest environmental and socio-economic changes during that time. Classified by the attributes of managers, the institutions regulating lumbering in Taiwan’s national forests could be divided into government- and private-managed ones and their origins could be traced to the Japanese colonial rule. When Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China, the Forest Bureau, which was later replaced by the Taiwan Forest Administration (TFA) in 1947, took over the high-valued and stock coniferous woodlands managed previously by both the Government-General of Taiwan and Japanese capitalists and then divided these lands into six government-managed lumbering grounds, with the Forestry Bureau monopolizing most of the timber market. Consequently, the situation of private-managed lumbering industries was similar to that during the Japanese colonial rule. Their lumbering was restricted to the low-valued and stocked hardwoods under the supervision of the forest administration. However, the market for fuel wood was almost wholly monopolized by these lumbering capitalists. In the early post-war period, demand for railroad sleeper cars, timber, and fuel wood kept rising. As a main timber provider, the TFA could not meet these demands, because of high costs of operations, the simplicity of the categories of wood it provided, and the inefficiency of management. The “institution for allocation and selling” was designed to alleviate this urgent situation. However, the operation of this institution was impacted by serious inflation, multiple structures of the timber market, and an unlimited demand for the wood by military agencies, resulting in that the running of government-managed lumbering grounds turned into a serious predicament. In this context, on the one hand, the state not only recognized the permits for lumbering acquired in the Japanese colonial rule of those private-managed lumbering capitalists, but also continued and consolidated their special positions by new institutions. The goals of the state were to integrate capitalists’ capacities so as to satisfy the rising and various demands, increase state revenues, thus compensating the deficits resulted from the allocation and selling of timber and providing finances to reforestation. On the other hand, in practice, these articulations facilitated capitalists’ capital accumulations accidentally and extracted society’s economic surpluses to support the production and reproduction of public-operated enterprises and military agencies. Moreover, the capacity of the state of reforest the lumbered woodlands was weakened, while rising prices of timber and fuel wood promoted people to fell trees illegally. Government- and private-managed lumbering industries were in fact often the main causes of forest destruction. Consequently, both society and the forest environment paid a heavy price for the resulting chaos during the early post-war period.