本文的研究對象是臺灣戰後土地制度轉型（1945-1953）內國家、地主與農民的互動過程。筆者們採取的是歷史社會學的視角，將戰後土地制度的轉型置於臺灣長期的歷史變遷過程裡，試圖建構一個歷史解釋模型。過去對戰後土地制度轉型的研究，特別是一九四九至一九五三年的土地改革，多傾向於探討國家如何改造農村階級關係。本研究質疑這過於強調國家自主性的論法。國家固然可以透過對於財產權的界定（在農村社會裡這些主要指的是土地所有權與租佃關係的界定）以及徵稅來型塑社會階級關係，但是，反過來說，以土地改革的過程為例，重塑階級關係的可能空間有多大，仍然受限於本身的制度效能與既存的社會階級結構。雖然這麼說，筆者們並非認定社會結構決定了國家與社會階級的行動。我們所能說的或許只是，行動者的利益與政治資與化們在既存社會結構裡的策略位置息息相關，並不依特定行動都（即使是最強而有力的「國家行動者」）的意願而自由更易的。既存的社會結構限制了將來變化的可能選擇。國家、地主與農民三個社會行動者分別座落在衝突的特定策略位置上，彼此依與自己所處的策略位置切身相關的利益，選擇行動。有鑑於此，筆者們除了在靜態面上探究什麼樣的社會經濟結構條件帶來土地改革的契機與限制外，並試圖藉由釐清與比較不同時期國家、地主與農民三者間的動態互動關係，以說明這個互動過程中行動者的提擇如何導引出三七五減租終至耕都有其田的結果。

This article studies the interaction among the state, landlords and peasantry in Taiwan post-war transformation of land tenure, in particular the land reform of 1940-1953. As widely known, the land reform constitutes a key to the understanding of development and social change in post-war Taiwan. However, most writers fail to locate the post-war land reform in the long-term socio-economic change of Taiwan and therefore are unable to provide a historical explanation for the interaction among the state, landlords, and peasantry. Most studies on Taiwan’s land reform tend to highlight how the KMT state reconstructed the class relationship in the countryside to form a small-holding agrarian society, which served its political purposes as well as the squeeze on agricultural surplus. As widely assumed, the state by means of defining property rights and taxation is able to shape the class structure. Yet, as shown in this study, the KMT state was not free to do so. Reshaping the agrarian class relationship through land policies not only depended upon the KMT state’s institutional capacity, but was constrained by existing class forces. The interests and political resourses of the collective actors can be traced back to their positions with the existing social structure. Actors make their own choice of action according to their strategic positions in the interest-conflicting social structure. As shown in this study, no one (not even the state) enjoyed absolute sway over the others. Applying socio-economic structure provided possibilities and imposed constraints toward Taiwan’s post-war land reform. Comparing the interaction among three main collective actors—the state, landlords, and peasantry—in various historical conjunctures, the paper highlights the “politics” in the post-war land reform in order to illuminate how the alliance and conflicts among actors led to the forced reduction of the rent rate (1949) and eventually to land redistribution (1953).