There are restless debates as to the truth of “the President's gun shut incidence“on March 19, 2004 and its possible impacts on the result of the next-day President election. In response, the Legislative Yuan passed the Law to Govern the 319 Gun-Shut Incidence Truth Investigation Committee (the Truth Investigation Committee) to set up a specified Committee to inspect the gun shut incidence. After its making, one third of the Legislators applied for a judicial interpretation on the ground that the Law had seriously infringed judicial independence as well as human rights and due process of law. The application was for the Grand Justice to declare the Law unconstitutional and to announce an “emergent disposition “to halt the application of the Law temporarily. As “emergent disposition" is not regulated under the Law Governing the Disposition of Cases by the Grand Justice, it is highly contested whether and how the Grand Justice should exercise such power. This paper thus intends to analyse, from the aspect of “Constitutional litigation“, relevant issues concerning the proclamation of an “emergent disposition“ by the Grand Justice in this country. It first discerns the possibilities of applying the Administrative Litigation Law mutatis matandis to make up the loopholes of the law and its boundaries. There are also other problems to be solved regarding this judicial interpretation including, for example, to create the formalities, contents, time limits, vote counting, relieves, and so on. Such problems need to be considered ornately instead of simply stating that the Grand Justice may initiate the procedure because “the Grand Justice is in charge of judicial interpretation" or“the temporary protection of rights is the nucleus of litigation right“. After the completion of this paper, the Grand Justice made Judicial Interpretation No.585, which refers to "emergent disposition“ as“temporary disposition“and acknowledged,“the security system is the core of litigation right, and so is it in Constitutional litigation. The Grand Justice is thus empowered to announce a temporary disposition. However, the present case has been solved by an interpretation in substantial terms, there is thus no punctual need to pronounce a temporary disposition“. Nevertheless, this paper argues that the Grand Justice has failed to tackle the main issues properly - in the absence of a law to govern the “emergent disposition“, how does the Grand Justice authorised to initiate the procedure and how to tackle other problems involving Constitutional litigation, which are also the focal points of this paper. In order to reach essential understanding over issues of Constitutional litigation involved in emergent disposition, the readers may compare and contrast amplifications of this paper with relevant elaborations in the text or expert reports of Interpretation 585.