賽局理論研究行為者為求利益極大，因應對方策略，調整自己策略的過程。應用賽局理論分析兩岸互動，一方面可以突顯政策形成的結構限制，另一面亦能闡釋政策往返、互賴的特性，在國內學界並不陌生。不過，過去國人探討兩岸賽局時，多集中在「囚徒賽局」的闡釋，希望雙方能建立互信機制，建構雙贏局面，避免雙輸，本文則假設兩岸有統獨的基本立場差異，雙方不可能放棄自己的基本立場。強求雙方採行合作策略，無異與納許均衡對抗，成功的機會不大。努力的目標或許不是尋求「囚徒賽局」下的最適解，而是根本改變賽局結構。事實上，過去兩岸都曾努力改變賽局結構，但功敗垂成。本文分析了八種可能存在的賽局結構，釐清其間關係，藉以探討兩岸關係的走向。同時，作者也發現兩岸似乎有產生新賽局結構的趨勢，如果屬實，兩岸的前景是樂觀的。

In game theory, it is assumed that each individual player is trying to maximize his own advantage by taking into account the strategy adopted by the other players. The application of game theory in general, and the prisoner's dilemma game in particular, is not unusual in the study of the Taiwan Strait relation. By building a mutual trust mechanism, it was concluded that a win-win solution can be found in the cross-strait prisoner's dilemma game. The Taiwan Strait conflict, however, stems from a long-standing disagreement between the two sides over the issue of independence versus unification. Each side keeps their basic position without compromise is not an unrealistic assumption. The optimum solution for the prisoner's dilemma game may then be overcome by the structure change of the game, leading to the possibility of a superior outcome. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to study the conditions under which a game structure change can actually work to prevent both sides from provoking each other.