威權政體為適應不斷變遷的環境，通常透過制度化方式來解決社會危機與維持統治正當性。自1998年後，村選委會的產生方式也開始被創設與修訂。本文從歷史制度論觀點，以《村民委員會組織法》與《村民委員會選舉辦法》做為分析對象，觀察村選委會制度演變動力與模式。於1998年前，因中共與學界忽視下，村選委會制度並未產生，產生有選舉卻無選舉專責機構，有選舉結果卻是黨基層組織操縱結果的現象。在學界與村民批評下，中共以推選方式組織選舉機關做為回應。海南省政府則轉變選委會產生規定，採直選辦法，但選舉結果卻不利於「一肩挑」的實行。在2010年，黨中央為降低貪腐問題而進行修法。從制度變遷模式來看，由於多數制度呈現路徑依賴現象，反映出不論在黨中央或是省市政府，都不希望制度大幅度變化。考量黨中央「穩定勝於一切」的統治邏輯與海南省的直選經驗，較民主的直選規定將難以成為未來制度發展的目標。僅管如此，未以直選手段來挑選較優秀的基層幹部，貪腐的問題仍會存在，而存在於制度間不協調所產生的貪腐，又將成為下次制度變遷的內生動力來源。

In order to resolve social crises and strengthen political legitimacy, China's authoritarian regime tends to adapt to the changing environment by means of institutionalization. Since 1998, regulations on how to organize village election committees have been instituted and revised. This paper applies historical institutionalism to observe the changing institutional forces and changing modes regarding village election committees. The norms of the village election committee, from village committee organizational law to election procedures,are viewed as the target for analysis. Ignored by China's central government and academic researchers, the institution of the village election committee was not established until 1998. In the preceding period marked by an institutional vacuum, villagers and academic researchers gradually became dissatisfied by the lack of a village election committee and election outcomes controlled by the grassroots organization of the Communist Party. China's central government responded to these criticisms by adopting the procedures of recommendation and election through a village election committee. In 2001, the Hainan provincial government converted its election procedure into a direct voting election, but the outcome of direct elections was detrimental to the enforcement of the “One Combination” principle. In 2010, China's central government starting to revise the original law in the hopes of reducing corruption problems. From the standpoint of the institutional change mode, the development of regulations for the village election committee mostly reflects the phenomena of path dependency. This implies that not only China's central government but provincial governments as well do not want to change the original institution drastically. Taking ＂political stability over everything＂ and the outcome of direct elections in Hainan into consideration, the paper argues that more democratic direct elections are unlikely to become the goal of institutional development in the future. However, because of the lack of direct elections, it is difficult to select competent cadres, further reinforcing the possibility of corruption among their ranks. The corruption stemming from the imbalance between institutions will become the endogenous driving force of future institutional change.