本文探討陸象山學問的詮釋學性格。主要內容分成三節。第一節指出，象山學問重視啟發性，而此啟發性的重點在於「心即理」命題。第二節則討論象山出席鵝湖之會，並藉著幾個尖銳問題質疑朱熹，從而呈現兩人的學問對比：朱熹是認知原則主導主體原則，象山是認知原則附屬於主體原則。第三節則揭示主體原則的詮釋學向度。象山的倫理學命題「六經皆我註腳」與「六經註我」其實是建立在主體原則：「本心之我」在詮釋學事件中會轉化為「詮釋之我」，而「詮釋之我」在詮釋中往往將經文的複雜性化約為簡單的綱領與要旨而忽略文脈細節。依據以上的討論，我們可以把象山學問視為一種「存有論詮釋學」，並有「詮釋學他律」的傾向。

In this article I examine the hermeneutical significance of Lu Xiangshan’s doctrine in three aspects. Firstly, I will demonstrate that Lu’s doctrine is premised on the concept that “the mind/heart is the (moral) principle.” Secondly, I discuss the so-called Goose Lake Conference, where Lu challenged Zhu Xi with some sharp questions. The argument, at heart, is: “the principle of epistemology” has priority over “the principle of subjectivity” according to Zhu, but for Lu, “the principle of subjectivity” reigns supreme. Thirdly, I explore the hermeneutical dimension of “the principle of subjectivity” to suggest that Lu’s famous propositions—“The Six Classics are my footnotes” and “The Six Classics interpret me”—are based on “subjectivity.” In other words, the “I as fundamental mind/heart (benxin)” will, in the hermeneutical process, transform into the “interpreting I.” At this turn, the “interpreting I” will typically render the complexity of the texts into principles and main ideas, sacrificing the textual nuances. To conclude, we understand Lu’s teaching as a kind of ontological hermeneutics, which bears the characteristics of heteronomy.