Following the trend of public-private partnership (PPP), the “Encouragement for Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Act” was passed in February 2001 in Taiwan. Based on the principles of most prudence of government and most participation of private sector, the public construction are commissioned by government, and built and operated by private investor to provide for public use. In this agency relationship, the government plans for public interest, while the private business works for profits. For this reason, it is ideal to evaluate BOT legal regime by economic analysis. Though the government has provided eminent domain, franchise, financing, tax reduction and other incentive mechanism in BOT model, the scheduling of construction, pricing and quality of the service in operation stage are supervised by government. The BOT investment contract is the basis of rights and duties between the public and private sector. This paper is to, from agency theory, evaluate the issues of agency assumption, agency risk, agency cost and information unsymmetrical of PPP model and BOT investment contract. Economic analysis of law is very useful in the disputes settlement of BOT investment contract, and it will clarify the role of public and private sectors in PPP. It will be an ideal reference to amend BOT law and draft BOT contract.