本文以臺中市單元二重劃區為案例，探討自辦市地重劃的預售抵費地現象，分析市地重劃之自辦轉向所牽動的土地金融化模式以及地方實作。開發商如何藉由重劃制度與重劃會組織操作抵費地預售？預售抵費地的融資方式、交易特徵、網絡結構為何？如何影響重劃區的土地市場與重劃治理？本文提出「非正式土地金融網絡」概念來加以解釋。為了在自辦重劃過程中加快運用金融槓桿，開發商研發一套預售抵費地的實作模式，藉由抵費地做為投資回饋，創造出吸納個人投資者與法人企業資金的新型態金融資產。預售抵費地的交易係內閉於特定政商網絡當中，由政商聯盟透過自訂私契進行治理，成為臺中都市發展的灰色地帶。在低度規管的狀況下，政商菁英藉由抵費地交易擷取了龐大地租，並衍生出尋租與金融弊端。

Taking Taichung’s Unit Two Readjustment Zone as an example, this article aims to explore the phenomenon of cost equivalent land’s pre-sale in the urban land readjustment implemented by private sector in Taichung’s “overall development unit”, and investigate the mechanisms of the land financialization and local implementation that are affected by the land readjustment’s “privatization turn”. Issues include how developers utilized the land readjustment association to pre-sell cost-equivalent land; financing models, transaction characteristics, and network structures of the costequivalent land pre-sales; and ways that cost-equivalent land pre-sales affect the readjustment zone’s land market and governance. To speed up the readjustment zone development, developers created cost-equivalent land pre-sale practices plus a new type of financing means that uses costequivalent land as an investment reward to absorb funds from both personal and corporate investors. This is considered a gray area in Taichung’s urban land readjustment. In the absence of sufficient regulations, political and business elites are collecting huge amounts of rent through cost-equivalent land transactions, resulting in intensified rent-seeking behaviors and financial abuses.