在魏晉玄學中，王弼與郭象的論爭至居較要。雖經不少學者研究，但迄今學界 對此一論爭之本質尚未能辨明。本文嘗試採用海德格的「存有思想」作為一解釋學 架構，以澈底釐清此一論爭的真正意義。特別地，我們所達致的結果顯示，道家義 之「自然」並不能化約至一「主體的境界」(如牟宗三先生所主張)；另一方面， 道家道之「無」亦不能等同為「空無一物的狀態」(如胡適之先生所主張)。更較 重要的是，我們清楚地揭示了「道家哲學」之「後現代性格」。

　　　　　Within the Neo-Taoism of the Wei-Tsin period, there was a famous controversy between Wang-pi and Kuo-hsiang. In opposition to Wang-pi's thesis of the primacy and the priority of Nothingness, Kuo-hsiang explicitly denied that Nothingness can function as a ground. However, despite the tremendous efforts of the contemporary scholars, the ture nature of this controversy remains unclear. In this article, we attempt to clarify as well as to settle this important controversy by employing Heidegger's thought as a hermeneutical framework. As a result, our clarification will also show thtat Nothingness in Taoist sense can neither be reduced to a subjective state of mind (as claimed by Mou Tsung-san) nor be identified with an empty space (as claimed by Hu-shih).