參考文獻
一、西文部分：
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6.Alt, J.E. and K. A. Chrystal (1983), Political Economics, University of California Press.
7.Becker, E. (1996), The Illusion of fiscal Illusion: Unsticking the Flypaper Effect, Public Choice, 86(1-2), 85-102.
8.Becker, G. S. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupe for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (3), 371-400.
9.Besley, T. and R. Burgess (2002), The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence From INDIA, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(14), 1415-1451.
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14.Buchanan, J. M. (1972), Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Preference, Theory of Public Choice, Eds. : J. M. Buchanan and R. D. Tollison, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
15.Buchanan, J. M. (1976), Taxation in Fiscal Exchange, Journal of Public Economics, 6(1-2), 17-29.
16.Buchanan, J. M. (1985), Liberty, Market and State─Political Economy in the 1980s. New York University Press.
17.Burman, L. E. and W. C. Randolph (1994), Measuring Permanent Responses to Capital-Gains Tax Changes in Panel Data, The American Economic Review, 84(4), 794-809.
18.Carlsen, F. (1997), Opinion Polls and Political Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence for the United States, Public Choice, 92(3-4), 387-406.
19.Carter, W. S. (1982), An Introduction to Henry George, Land Value Taxation : The Progress and Poverty Centenary ,Eds. : Lindholm R. and Lynn A. The University Wisconsin Press, 19-35.
20.Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Rowk.
21.DiPasquale D. and W. C. Wheaton (1992), The Cost of Capital, Tax Reform, and The Future of The Rental Housing Market, Journal of Urban Economics, 31(3), 337-359.
22.Edwards, J. and M. Keen (1996), Tax Competition and Leviathan. European Economic Review, 40, 113-134.
23.Fiorina, M. P. (1982), Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process, Public Choice, 39(1), 33-66.
24.Finz, S. A. and S. E. Utink (2001), Closing the Budget Gap through Tax Base Appreciation, Government Finance Review, 17(5), 26-29.
25.Fuest, C. (2000), The Political Economy of Tax Coordination as a Bargaining Game Between Bureaucrats and Politician, Public Choice, 103(3-4), 357-382.
26.Galli, E. and S. P. S. Rossi (2002), Political Budget Cycles: The Case of the Western German , Public Choice, 110(3-4), 283-303.
27.Gans, J. S. and M. Smart (1996), Majority Voting with Single-Crossing Preferences, Journal of Public Economics, 59(2), 219-237.
28.Gihring, T. A. (1999), Incentive Property Taxation: A Potential Tool for Urban Growth Management, Journal of the American Planning Association, 65(1), 62-79.
29.Greene, W.H. (2002), LIMDEP Version 8.0 Econometric Modeling Guide, Vol.1, Econometric Software, INC.
30.Hausman, J. A (1978), Specification Test in Econometrics, Econometrica, 46, 1251-1272.
31.Hausman, J. A. and W.E. Taylor (1981), Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects, Econometrica, 49, 1377-1398.
32.Hibbs, D. (1977), Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy, American Political Science Review, 71, 1467-1487.
33.Hoffman, E. (1997), Public Choice Experiments, Perspectives on Public Choice - A Hand Book, Ed.: Mueller, Cambridge University Press, 415-428.
34.Hunter, W. J. and M. A.. Nelson (1995), Tax Enforcement: A Public Choice Perspective, Public Choice, 82(1-2), 53-67.
35.Kalwij, A. (2000), Estimating The Economic Return to Schooling on The Basis of Panel Data, Applied Economics, 32(1), 61-71.
36.Krelove, R. (1992), Do Local Government Use Tax Bases Efficiently？, Journal of Urban Economics, 31(3), 285-300.
37.Lachlar, U. (1982), On Political Business Cycles with Endogenous Election Dates, Journal of Public Economic, 17(1), 111-117.
38.Luginbuhl R. and de Vos A. (2003), Seasonality and Markov Switching in an Unobserved Component Time series Model: A Bayesian Analysis of US GDP, Empirical Economics, 28(2), 365-386.
39.McCluskey, W. J., F. Plimmer and O. P. Connellan (1998), Ad Valorem Property Tax: Issues of Fairness and Equity, Assessment Journal, 5(3), 47-55.
40.McCallum, B. T. (1978), The Political Business Cycle: An Empirical Test, Southern Economic Journal, 44, 504-515.
41.Mieszkowski, P.(1972),The Property Tax :An Excise Tax or A Profit Tax？, Journal of Public Economics ,1(1) , 73~96.
42.Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. and Spolaore, E. (1994), How Cynical Can an Incumbent Be？: Strategic Policy in a Model of Government Spending, Journal of Public Economy, 55, 121-140.
43.Moesen, W. and P. V. Cauwenberge (2000), The Status of The Budget Constraint, Federalism and The Relative Size of Government: A Bureaucracy Approach, Public Choice, l04(2), 207-224.
44.Mueller, D. C. (1989), Public Choice II, Cambridge University Press.
45.Mueller, D. C. (1997), Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge University Press.
46.Mullineux, A., D. G. Dicikinson and W. Peng (1993), Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence, Blackwell.
47.Musgrave, R. A. and B. Peggy (1984), Public Finance in theory and Practice, New York: McGraw-Hill.
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51.Niskanen, W. A. (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine Press.
52.Niskanen, W. A. (1975), Bureaucrats and Politicians, Journal of Law and Economics, 18(3), 617-644.
53.Niskanen, W. A. (1991), A Reflection on Bureaucracy and Representative Government, The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat: Appraisals and Evidence, Eds. : Blais and Dion , University of Pittsburgh Press, 13-31.
54.Niskanen, W. A. (1994), Bureaucracy and Public Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
55.Nordhaus, W. D. (1975), The Political Business Cycle, Review of Economic Studies, 42, 169-190.
56.North, D. C. (1978), Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History, Journal of Economic Literature, 16(3), 963-978.
57.North, D. C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, New York, Norton.
58.North, D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, New York: Cambridge University Press.
59.Oates, W. E. (1999), Local Property Taxation: An Assessment, Assessment Journal, 6(5), 67-69.
60.Peltzman, S. (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation , Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), 211-240.
61.Pitlik, N., G. Schmid and H. Strotmann, (2001), Bargaining Power of Smaller States in Germany’s L nderfinanzausgleich 1979-90, Public Choice, 109(1-2), 183-201.
62.Price, S. (1997), Political Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Credibility: A Survey, Public Choice, 92(3-4), 407-427.
63.Price, S. (1998), Comment on ‘The Politics of the Political Business Cycle’, British Journal of Political Science, 28(1), 201-210.
64.Reid, B.G. (1998), Endogenous Elections, Electoral Budget Cycles and Canadian Provincial Governments, Public Choice, 97(1-2), 35-48.
65.Roakes , S. L.(1996),Reconsidering Land Value Taxation : The Golden Key？, Land Use Policy , 13(4), 261-272.
66.Rogoff, K.(1990), Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, The American Economic Review, 80(1), 21-36.
67.Sapir, A. and K. Sekkat (2002), Political Cycles, Fiscal Deficits, and Output Spillovers in Europe, Public Choice, 111(1-2), 195-205.
68.Schultz, K. A.(1995), The Politics of the Political Business Cycle, British Journal of Political Science, 25(1), 79-99.
69.Silagi, M.(1992), Henty George and Europ: Publicized George’s Ideas in Germany, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 51(4), 495-501.
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72.Varian, H. R. (1984), Microeconomic Analysis, W. W. Norton and Company.
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75.Yinger, J. (1985), Inefficiency and the Median Voter: Property Taxes, Capitalization, Heterogeneity, and the Theory of the Second Best, Perspective on Local Public Finance and Public Policy, Ed.: J. M. Quigely,Vol.2 , JAI Press INC , 3-30.
76.Yoo, Keum-Rok (1998), Intervention Analysis of Electoral Tax Cycle: The Case of Japan, Public Choice, 96(3-4), 241-258.
二、中文部分：
（一）書籍與期刊
1.王振寰 (1996)，誰統治台灣？─轉型中的國家機器與權力結構，巨流圖書公司。
2.王鐵生譯 (1993)，G. K. Wilson著，利益團體，五南圖書出版公司。
3.朱雲鵬 (2003)，就業密集產業之發展，第七屆經濟發展學術研討會論文─當前失業問題探討，1-17。
4.朱鎮明 (1996)，制度、官僚與政策過程─分析政府運作之概念性架構，洪葉文化事業公司。
5.江明修、劉梅君譯 (1995)，J. Forster著，面對權力的規劃，五南圖書出版公司。
6.林英彥 (2002a)，估價師的前途在那裡，土地問題研究季刊，1(3)，頁129-131。
7.林英彥 (2002b)，韓國之地價公示與土地等之估價法，土地問題研究季刊，1(4)，頁1-4。8.林英彥 (2003)，日本與韓國實施標準宗地評估制度概說，土地問題研究季刊，2(2)，頁50-56。9.竺乾威、胡君芳譯 (1991)，C. E. Lindblm著，決策過程，五南圖書出版公司。
10.夏道平譯 (1991)，L. v. Mises著，人的行為(上)，遠流出版公司。
11.許松 (1987)，重新規定地價有關問題之探討，土地行政，14，頁38-40。
12.許松 (1994)，如何建立地價公信力，臺灣地政，98，頁5-8。
13.陳奉瑤、梁仁旭 (2003)，日本的路線價估價法，土地問題研究季刊，2(2)，頁39-49。
14.陳浩譯 (1990)，J. A.. Basso著，壓力團體，遠流出版公司。
15.陳慶梅 (2000)，土地稅稅基公平性之研究(二)，現代地政，228，頁37-41。
16.陳寶瑜 (1987)，台灣省重新規定地價問題探討: 探討外在因素對重新規定地價作業影響，土地行政，21，頁17-19。
17.黃淑惠 (2000)，改進我國地價稅稅基評估之研究─兼論無母數迴歸模型之應用，土地經濟年刊，11，頁135-159。18.張時應 (1992)，土地增值稅評論，台灣土地金融季刊，29(1)，頁49-70。
19.張梅英 (1994)，重新規定地價之檢討，臺灣地政，98，頁13-16。
20.張慈佳 (2001)，政治景氣循環現象對房地產價格之研究，政治大學地政學系士論文。21. 黃上紡 (1996)，選舉與經濟─政治景氣循環，美歐月刊，11(5)，頁51-66。
22.彭建文 (2000)，台灣房地產景氣循環之研究─生產時間落差、宣告效果、總體經濟之影響，政治大學地政學系博士論文。23.曾巨威 (2002)，各項租稅稅基侵蝕之全面檢討，行政院財政改革委員會委託研究計劃，計劃編號: PG9019-0132。
24.游適銘 (2001)，地價及標準地價評議委員會功能定位之探討，人與地，206，頁10-15。
25.傅彥凱 (2002)，民主政治下的經濟政策制定：政治景氣循環理論之分析，中國行政評論，11(3)，頁139-163。26.熊秉元 (1993)，尋找心中那把尺，天下文化出版公司。
27.熊秉元 (1996)，公益彩券、制度經濟學、公共選擇，經社法制論叢，第17,18，頁41-63。28.劉明德譯 (1991)，C. E. Lindblm著，政策制定過程，桂冠圖書出版公司。
29.劉其昌 (1994)，公共選擇理論分析，今日會計，57，頁29-60。
30.劉瑞華譯 (1996)，D. C. North著，制度、制度變遷與經濟成就，時報文化出版公司。
31.蔡吉源 (2001)，台灣土地稅制的問題、影響與改革，突破當前經濟困境系列座談會，國家政策研究基金會，頁1-5。
32.蔡雪枝 (1994)，淺述規定地價與地價稅制變遷，臺灣地政，98，頁16-23。
33.鄭瓊秋 (1982)，公共選擇與投票行為理論之研究，政治大學財政研究所碩士論文。
34.鍾英理 (1998)，以區段地價指數改進公告土地現值制度之參考，政治大學地政學系碩士論文。
35.蕭全政 (1994)，政治與經濟的整合---政治經濟學的基礎理論，桂冠圖書公司。36.蕭錚 (1974)，平均地權本義，中國地政研究所。
37.關秉寅 (1994)，誰的公平?誰的正義?--從土地增值稅之爭議談公平與權力之關係，人文及社會科學集刊，6，頁99-133。38.蘇志超 (1995)，土地行政綱要，文笙書局經銷。
（二）政府資料庫與出版品
1.中央選舉委員會歷屆公職人員選舉資料庫: http://210.69.23.189/cec/。
2.台灣人權政府相關檔案線上展示: http://near.archives.gov.tw/Human_Right/。
3.國家文官培訓所資料庫: http://www.ncsi.gov.tw/administration/。
4.中央選舉委員會 (1984)，中華民國選舉概況(下篇)。
5.內政部 (2002)，都市地價指數，第18期。
6.內政部統計處 (2001-2002)，中華民國八十九年至九十年內政統計年報。
7.內政部營建署 (1993)，中華民國八十一年臺灣地區營建統計年報。
8.內政部營建署 (2000)，中華民國八十八年臺閩地區營建統計年報。
9.行政院經濟建設委員會 (1988-2001)，都市及區域發展統計彙編─中華民國七十七年至九十年。
10.臺灣省政府地政處 (1996-1998)，臺灣省各縣市(八十五年至八十七年)公告土地現值業務督導考核結果。
11.臺灣省政府地政處(1997)，臺灣省政府地政處志。
12.臺灣省選舉委員會 (1994)，八十二年、八十三年公職人員選舉台灣省選務實錄。
13.臺灣省選舉委員會 (1998)，八十六年、八十七年地方公職人員選舉臺灣省選務實錄。