本文嘗試從A. Downs為首的「中位選民定理」（Median Voter Theorem）出發，從台灣2000年的總統選舉，觀察陳水扁在統獨問題上的新中間路線，對選舉結果的影響究竟為何。在分析架構上，是依Adams and Merrill （1999）的機率式投票模式（probability ovter model）為基礎，整合政策的空間及方向作用力，並計入非政策面向的影響，以條件式勝算對數模型（Conditional Logit）來分析。 本文的發現可歸納出以下幾點：一、統獨立場不鮮明的中間選民不再是泛藍穩固的支持群眾，他們投票給陳水扁的機率遠高於其他候選人；二、陳水扁另一個與傳統民進黨情況不同的是，他相較於連、宋在吸納統派選票上並沒有絕對的劣勢，而且如果能越向統獨中間靠攏，越能吸引統派選票，不過當然也會因此而流失部分獨派選民的支持；三、中間選民事實上對新中間路線並不敏感，支持各個參選人的機率並不會因為陳水扁向中央靠而有太大的改變；四、宋楚瑜受新中間路線的影響較連戰來得小，所以陳水扁的競選口號除了提昇本身的選票外，主要的作用在能吸納連戰的票源；最後，從扁、連、宋三人能吸引到最多票數的最適位置來看，的確會如中位選民定理預期般的往中間立場集結，但也發現陳水扁即便站在極端偏獨的立場，吸引到的選票比例與中間路線相去不遠，所以方向論者的最適極端理論也得到了印證。

This paper based on A. Downs' Median Voter Theorem, explores Chen Shui-Bian's Third-way policy in unification-independence issue during the 2000 presidential election. The character of the empirical framework, based on the probability voter model proposed by Adams and Merrill (1999), is to incorporate both policies' proximal and directional effects and to integrate the non-policy influence into the electoral decision. According to the Conditional Logit analysis, the paper has the flowing observations. First, the median voters w ho do not have distinct unification-independence preferences do not support the pan-blue sturdily as usual. They are more likely to vote for Chen. Second. unlike the pan-green tradition, Chen personally is able to attract the voters that prefer the unification if Chen moves towards the neutral point, given that he might lose some votes of the independence extremists. Third, people ho prefer maintaining the status quo do not change their electoral decision much corresponding to Chen's Third-way policy. Fourth, comparing with Lian, Song is less affected by Chen's policy. Finally, this paper also convinces the influence of directional theory by finding Chen's optimal location is either in the medial or in the extreme positions.