台灣人民的政治認同與身份認同有了明顯的改變，但主要是國家認同光譜兩極的消長，維持現狀的中間路線仍然是主要的力量，從這樣的觀察來看，台灣的國家認同呈現轉變，但主體的認同並沒有大幅度的變化。 台灣民意確實呈現與大中國漸行漸遠的趨勢，對中國大陸而言，就是離一個中國愈來愈遠。當北京不斷強調一個中國原則的同時，事實上，兩岸關係發展的僵局也就被這個結所束縛，那就是：台灣人民認同產生轉變，但大陸當局的認同並沒有轉變，這種認知落差的格局造成兩岸關係無法大幅改善的僵局。 對北京而言，要解開這個結，當然就是要試圖改變台灣人民認同轉變的趨勢，從趨獨轉向趨統。強硬的政策顯然達不到北京預期的效果，過度堅持一中也無法扭轉台灣國家認同的轉變趨勢。 如果北京選擇的是武力解決，選擇的是反獨，那麼，目前的對台政策確實仍可達到嚇阻法理台獨的效果，兩岸敵對氛圍的效果。但是，如果北京選擇的是自己揭櫫的和平統一，北京恐怕得調整對台政策，設法降低兩岸的敵對、減少嚇阻、增強良性互動，如此，才能夠面對民心向背這個兩岸關係真正的難題。

There are obvious changes of Taiwanese political and self identity in the past two decades. Maintaining the status quo is still the main stream but the pro-China/unification and pro-Taiwan/independency reveal great changes. There is a tendency away from great China from the poll of Taiwanese people, but Beijing still insists on One-China politics. Therefore, the drop height of identity across the Taiwan Strait became an unsolved knot for the two sides. If Beijing wants to solve this knot, she has to try to change the tendency of Taiwanese identity from pro-independence to pro-unification. Using the tough way to threaten Taiwanese people seemed ineffective for China’s goal, and the insistency on One-China principle also could not turn back the Taiwan national identity. If Beijing chooses the armed forces to solve the knot, therefore, she could achieve the goal and only the goal of deterring Taiwan’s legal independency. If Beijing chooses to reunify Taiwan, then she has to change her Taiwan policy. For Beijing, she has tried her best to reducing the cross-strait hostility, decreasing the deterrence, and enriching the benignant interaction to solve the knot.