台灣與俄羅斯在二 ○○八年總統選舉之後的政治制度有著許多相似的特性，例如兩國的總統都擁有單獨任免總理的權力；兩國的國會都存在擁有三分之二以上席次的政黨，而且府會關係是一致的。由於這些相似性，所以兩國應該擁有相似的內閣穩定度。然而，實際的政治運作卻非如此，究竟是什麼原因造成這樣的差異，這是本文分析的重點。本文認為，台灣與俄羅斯的權力中心並不相同，所以造成兩國的內閣穩定度相當不同。三個因素決定權力中心的歸屬，分別是：總統權力的來源與存續條件以及總統對國會的掌控能力。經由對於兩國的深入分析，本文的假設獲得實證資料的支持。

Taiwan and Russia have shared some important similarities in terms of institutional configurations since the presidential elections of 2008. Taiwan and Russia are led by presidents with strong constitutional powers, and face little legislative opposition from friendly parliaments. In both cases, the president belongs to a party than controls around two-thirds of parliamentary seats. However, contrary to the claims of much of the existing literature, these similarities do not make the cabinets of the two countries equally stable. This paper argues that, because of important differences in who wields actual political power, cabinet stability varies across the two cases. Three factors decides where the apex of political power is located: how the president is elected, how easily he or she can be removed from the presidency, and whether a president serves as a de facto leader of the biggest party of a parliament. This paper undertakes an in-depth comparison between Russia and Taiwan, providing supporting evidence for a link between the location of the apex of political power and cabinet stability under unified government.