The main purpose of this paper is to see into the regulations of administrative contracts under the 135th to the 149th articles of our Administrative Procedure Law, in order to organize and analyze the factual influence of such regulations on domestic administrative and judicial practices. As this study goes, it reveals that while the Administrative Procedure Law has been put into practice for more than 4 years, the arguments over practical issues mostly center on whether contracts signed by administrative organizations are contracts in public law (namely “administrative contracts") or simply contracts in private law. In other words, to make a distinction between contracts in public law and contracts in private law has always been the greatest difficulty in our country's administrative and judicial practices, even up to the present time. Seeing such practical difficulties, this paper therefore proposes the theory of "inference from the subject in contract," which views the subject in a contract as the principal, and the object as the exceptional. Such inference will simplify the standard of making a distinction between contracts in public law and contracts in private law: whatever contracts signed by administrative organizations are inferred in principle to be administrative contracts; only when in a contract the judicially related whole — the part of rights and the other of duties as well — is leading to the private law, will the contract be exceptionally concluded to be a contract in the private law. This theory thus not only can solve the difficulty of making a distinction between contracts in public law and contracts in private law, but in practice also can bring about actual benefits resulting from such a distinction.