人力進用彈性化是近年公共部門改革的重要措施之一，當中契約進用人力是主要手段之一。表面上契約用人的方法都是大同小異，但在公共部門中的契約人力涵意則較為複雜，意義會因其相對於公務員系統的關係而有所變異。本文是以臺灣與香港之政府機關契約人力制度作比較，突出這些差異及探討其背後之意義。本文會指出由於香港是使用習慣法(common law)之地區；而臺灣是使用大陸法(continental law)之地區，使兩地在推動「管理主義」改革上產生不同之實效。前者由於習慣法的彈性體系使香港政府有較大的空間進行「管理主義」式改革；而後者仍留於「法條化」式的改革，這不僅意味著「成文化」的程序滯後；在實際操上更是「非彈性化」。就以上觀點，本文會利用香港一九九九年引進的非公務員合約僱員與臺灣一直沿用的政府機關約聘僱人員及正在研擬中的契約人力制度作比較，指出香港的非公務員合約僱員雖然在人事系統及薪資福利上與傳統公務員分開，但在職責權力上是與傳統公務員重疊，加上香港沒有國家考試制度，這意味著契約人力對傳統公務員的可替代性及對該系統的潛在衝擊性。相反地，臺灣政府機關的約聘僱人員及未來的契約人力不單在人事系統，也在職責權力上與傳統公務員區隔，公務員的特殊權力地位仍然是神聖不可侵犯的。最終，本文會指出臺灣以多元化進用人力方式並不能達至真正的彈性化，而香港的「讓管理者管理」配以財務上的彈性才能達至彈性化之效果。

Personnel flexibilization is one of recent significant reform measures in the public sector, in which contractualization is a major vehicle. It seems that methods of contractualization are more or less the same, but their implications are more complicated for the public sector. The implications vary with how it is associated with the civil service system. This paper is an attempt to single out the variation and implications behind the contractualization through comparing the cases of Taiwan and Hong Kong. This paper pinpoints that there is variation of outcomes between the two places in adopting the managerial reforms due to the common law background of Hong Kong and the continental law background of Taiwan. Hong Kong with the flexibility endowment under the common law system is better able to wield the tools of the managerial reforms; while Taiwan's reform is largely confined to lingering “codification” of reform policies and ironically it is per se not flexibilization but “deflexibilization.” To substantiate the above point, this paper compares the example of the “non-civil service contract staff” (NCSCS) introduced into Hong Kong in 1999 with the existing government contract staff system and with a newly-proposed contract staff system in Taiwan. It argues that even though there is a division in terms of personnel and compensation systems between NCSCS and careerbased civil servants in Hong Kong, the authority and the responsibility of two forces are largely overlapped. Without such a civil service examination as in Taiwan, it implies that there is a high potential of substitutability of careerbased civil servants by the contract-based workforce. By contrast, not only the personnel and the compensation systems but also the authority and the responsibility between contract-based staff and career-based civil servants are divided. The privileged status of career-based civil servants is kept intact under the contractualization. In a word, the paper argues that the diversification of public employment in Taiwan is unable to cause the effect of flexibilization, but “let the managers manage” approach of Hong Kong plus financial flexibilities is indeed conducive to flexibilization.