一、中文部分
(一)專書
行政院科技顧問組，2010。《2010資通安全政策白皮書》。臺北：中華民國行政院。
東鳥，2014。《數據獵殺：一場輸不起的全球網路戰爭》，臺北：上奇時代。
東鳥，2013。《失控的正當性：揭密斯諾登背後的超規模全球監聽計畫》，臺北：上奇時代。
東鳥，2013。《全球最危險的人物：朱利安‧阿桑奇 維基解密創辦人阿桑奇，改寫全球人民對公權力的信念》，臺北：上奇時代。
林博文，1999。《歷史的暗流：近代中美關係秘辛》。臺北：元尊出版。
崔龍中，2013。《中情局長秘密檔案》。湖北：華中科技大學出版社。
張殿清，2001。《情報與反情報》。臺北：時英文化。
張文貞、葉俊榮、王必芳等，2005。《緊急狀態法制之探討行政院研究》。臺北：行政院研究發展考核委員會。
彭慧鸞，2011。《網路安全治理的新紀元從美國網際網路國際戰略談起》。臺北：國立政治大學國際關係研究中心。
隋岩，2014。《竊聽風雲：斯諾登與稜鏡計劃》。中國法制出版社。
(二) 專書譯著
Anne-Marie Slaughter，馬占斌、田潔譯，2009。《這才是美國：如何在一個危險的世界中堅守我們的價值》。北京：新星出版社。
Bernard Bourdeix著，高楓楓譯，2010。《世界級陰謀》(Le grand livre des conspirations)。江蘇：人民出版社。
Luke Harding著，何星、周仁華、李廣才、花愛萍、孫志明譯，2014。《斯諾登檔案：世界最大洩密事件內幕揭秘》。北京：金城出版社。
Gordon Thomas著，枝椏譯，2005。《以色列情報局》(MOSSAD)。臺北：智庫文化。
Robert Kagan & William Kristol 著，楊紫函等譯，2002。《當前威脅：美國外交與國防政策的危機與契機》(Present Dangers：Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy) 。臺北：國防部。
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt著，楊永生譯，2003。《網路及網路戰》（Networks and. Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, And Militancy）。臺北：國防部。
Steven Metz著，國防部史政編譯局譯，2002。《美國戰略：美國四年期國防總檢的議題與方案》(American Strategy：Issues and Alternatives for the Quadrennial Defense Review) 。臺北：國防部。
(三) 期刊論文
張明偉，2010/12。〈監聽風雲－以通訊監察進行國家情報工作之規範檢討〉，《軍法專刊》，第56卷第6期，頁164-181。
趙國材，2013/10。〈人類普遍價值的最大諷刺：斯諾登閉口噤聲若寒蟬〉，《海峽評論》，第274期，頁9-12。
蔡庭榕，2003/8。〈論反恐怖主義行動法制與人權保障〉，《刑事法雜誌》，第47卷第4 期，頁9-12。華盛頓的全球賭博 / 彼得.高恩(Peter Gowan)著 ; 顧薇,金芳譯. 江蘇省, 2003 : 江蘇人民. 霸權之間: 世界體系與亞歐大陸腹地的發展 / 任洪生著.
北京市 : 北京大學出版社, 2006.
資本主義不是什麼 What capitalism is not / 許寶強著上海市 : 上海人民出版社, 2007
資本主義全球化的瘋狂邏輯/ 威廉.格雷德(William Greider)著 ; 張定準,周新琦,夏家駟譯北京 : 社會科學文獻出版社, 2003
批判的範式 : 帝國主義政治經濟學 / 羅納德.H.奇爾科特主編 ; 施楊譯.
(Chilcote, Ronald H.) 北京 : 社會科學文獻出版社, 2001.
世界史的結構 / 柄谷行人著 ; 林暉鈞譯.
臺北市 : 心靈工坊文化出版 ; [新北市新莊區] : 大和書報總經銷, 2013[民102]
國際關係中的野蠻與文明/ 馬克.B.索爾特(Mark B. Salter)著 ; 肖歡容等譯. 北京 : 華新, 2004.
全球化下的後殖民省思 / 李英明著. 臺北市, 2003[民92] : 生智出版 : 揚智文化總經銷.控訴帝國: 21世紀世界秩序中的全球化及其抵抗 Hardt Michael Negri Antonio Aronowitz Stanley桂林 : 廣西師範大學出版社, 2004.
帝國 / 麥可.哈德(Michael Hardt), 安東尼奧.納格利(Antonio Negri)作 ; 韋本, 李尚遠譯.Hardt MichaelNegri Antonio 1933-韋本 李尚遠臺北市 ; [臺北縣新店市], 2002[民91] : 商周出版 :
城邦文化發行 : 農學總經銷.
超克現代 : 台社後/殖民讀本 / 陳光興編. 臺北市 : 臺灣社會研究雜誌出版 : 唐山發行, 2010[民99]
邁向國際法治 : 聯合國對人道主義危機的回應 [簡體書] / 讓-馬克.誇克(Jean-Marc Coicaud)著 ; 周景興譯
帝國的話語政治 : 從近代中西衝突看現代世界秩序的形成 / 劉禾著 ; 楊立華等譯. 北京市 : 生活.讀書.新知三聯書店, 2009.
全球化與資本主義危機 /金寶瑜著臺北市 : 巨流, 民94全球化與後殖民批評 [簡體書] / 王甯,薛曉源主編. 北京 : 中央編譯出版社, 1998.
帝國 : 全球化的政治秩序 / Hardt MichaelNegri Antonio著 ; 楊建國,范一亭譯.
新美帝國主義 : 布希的反恐戰爭和以血換石油 / 瓦西利斯.福斯卡斯(Vassilis K. Fouskas), 比倫特.格卡伊(Bulent Gokay)著 ; 薛穎譯. 北京市, 2006 : 世界知識
漫長的20世紀 [簡體書] : 金錢、權力與我們社會的根源 / (意)傑奧瓦尼.阿銳基(Giovanni Arrighi)著 ; 姚乃強, 嚴維明, 韓振榮譯南京市 : 江蘇人民出版社, 2001
透過錢眼看大國興衰 / 波音作. 臺北市 : 遠流, 2013[民102]
粉碎邪惡軸心 : 如何在二０二五年之前消滅世界上最後的獨裁者 = Breaking the Real Axis of Evil / 馬克.帕瑪(Mark Palmer)著 ; 王文昱譯. 美國, 2005[民94] : 博大出版.
霸權之間:世界體系與亞歐大陸腹地的發展任 洪生版本項:第1版.出版項:北京市 : 北京大學出版社, 2006.
平衡：從古羅馬到今日美國的大國興衰: Glenn Hubbard & Tim Kane, 中信出版社,2015
敘利亞戰爭：美國從不公開的中東地緣博奕與野心(Washington’s Long War on Syria, Stephen Gowans)，黃開譯，大寫出版,2017/8/29
(四)論文
吳胤瓛，2002/12/14-15。〈美國對外戰略的雙軌操縱與歐洲反應－以Echelon間諜情報網及海外駐軍基地部署為例〉，「臺灣政治學會2002年年會暨全球化與臺灣政治」學術研討會。嘉義國立中正大學：臺灣政治學會。頁1-32。
丁崑耀，2007,二十一世紀的世界秩序影像：美國帝國與後現代帝國論述之競逐，國立中山大學政治學研究所碩士論文。
(五) 網際網路
丁剛，2000/2/ 25。〈歐盟揭露美國電子間諜網〉，《人民日報》，〈http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/channel2/18/20000225/7342.html〉。
2011/1/10。〈陸軍網絡司令部（ARCYBER）〉，《知遠戰略與防務研究所論壇》，〈http://forum.defence.org.cn/archiver/?tid-35291.html〉。
2013/6/14。〈美龐大情報監控系統曝光 能監聽國家領導人通訊〉，《中國網軍事》， 〈http://big5.china.com.cn/gate/big5/military.china.com.cn/2013-06/14/content_29123220_2.htm〉。
2013/6/30/。〈揭開美國網軍面紗：純銅包裹建築防信號外泄〉，《京報網-北京晚報》，〈http://news.xinhuanet.com/info/2013-06/23/c_132478458.htm〉。
二、外文部分
(一) 官方文件
EUROPEAN UNION，2001/7/11,”2001 EU Parliament Report: Echelon Global Private and Commercial Communications Interception System “,
〈http://publicintelligence.net/2001-eu-parliament-report-echelon-global-private-and-commercial-communications-interception-system/ 〉〈 http://info.publicintelligence.net/ECHELONreport.pdf〉
(二)專書
James Bamford, 1983.The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency. Penguin Books
Bob Woodward, 1975/10/13 ,"Messages of Activists Intercepted" ,Washington Post, pp. A1, A14.
Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Cambridge: Ballinger, 2nd ed., 1989/Boulder:
Westview Press, 3rd ed., 1995; 4th ed., 1999); See also the World Wide Web site of the Federation of
American Scientists, 〈http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid16.htm〉
Amano, R. A and S. Norden, (1998),“Oil Prices and the Rise and Fall of the U.S. Real Exchange Rate”, Journal of International Money and Finance, vol.17,299-316.
Bollerslev, T. (1986), “Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity,” Journal of Econometrics, 31, 307-27.
Camarero, M. and C. Tamarit, (2002),“Oil prices and Spanish competitiveness: A cointegrated panel analysis”, Journal of Policy Modeling, vol.24, 591-605.
Capie, F. , Mills, T. C. and Wood, G. (2005),“Gold as a Hedge against The Dollar”, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money, vol.15, 343-352. 53 Cologni, A. and M. Manera (2008),“Oil prices, Inflation and Interest Rates in a Structural Cointegrated VAR model for the G-7 Countries”, Energy Economics, vol.30, 856-888.
Dooley, M. P., P. Isard and M.P. Taylor(1995)“Exchange rates, country-specific shocks, and gold”, Applied Financial Economics, vol.5, 121-129.
Engle, R. F. (1982), “Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation,” Econometrica, 50, 987-1008.
Nelson, Charles R., and Charles Plosser (1982), “Trends and random walks on macroeconomic time series”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 10, 139-162.
Nikos, K. (2006),“Commodity prices and the influence of the US dollar”, World GoldCouncil.
Phillips, P., and P. Perron. (1989). “Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression.”Biometrika. Vol. 75, pp. 335–346.
Rautava, J. (2004),“The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia’s economy –a cointegration approach”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 2004, vol. 32, issue 2,315-327.
(三)期刊論文
2000/2, “Legal Standards for the Intelligence Community in Conducting Electronic Surveillance” ,FAS,
〈http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/standards.html〉
2013/6/ 21, “The NSA, the FCPA and Parallels of History”,TRACE, 〈http://traceblog.org/2013/06/21/the-nsa-the-fcpa-and-parallels-of-history/〉
James Risen and Eric Lichtblaub, 2005/11/16, ”Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts” ,New York Times , 〈http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?_r=0〉
Jill Lawrence, 2013/6/7,”Why PRISM is Different and Scarier Than Other NSA Spying－The latest surveillance program in the news is the most intrusive, and investigating who leaked it will be a stiff test of administration restraint.”, National Journal, 〈http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/why-prism-is-different-and-scarier-than-other-nsa-spying-20130607〉Jeralyn, 2008/2/19,“Supreme Court Refuses Review of NSA Wiretapping Case” , TALKLEFT ,
〈http://www.talkleft.com/story/2008/2/19/11029/2163/supremecourt/Supreme-Court-Refuses-Review-of-NSA-Wiretapping-Case 〉
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlmfoith, ”American Primacy in Perspective” ,Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No. 4, July/Aug 2002, , pp.20-33Steve Kettmann , 2001/6/20.”Does Europe Covet Own Echelon?”, WIRED,〈http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/06/44689〉
Steve James，2000/4/12,”Revelations about Echelon spy network intensify US-European tensions”，World Socialist Web Site 〈https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/04/spy-a12.html 〉
Said, S.E. and Dickey, D. A. (1984). “Testing for Unit Roots in utoregressive-MovingAverage Models of Unknown Order,” Biometrika 71, pp.599-607.
Tanaka Sakai，2000/3/2,”世界中の通訊を盜聴する巨大システム”，TANAKANEWS， 〈http://tanakanews.com/a0302echelon.htm〉
Verge Staff , 2013/717,”Everything you need to know about PRISM”, THE VERGE,
〈http://www.theverge.com/2013/7/17/4517480/nsa-spying-prism-surveillance-cheat-sheet〉
Yossi Melman, 2013/10/28,” The NSA affair and the dogmatic notion of privatization”, I24NEWS 〈http://www.i24news.tv/en/opinion/131027-the-nsa-affair-and-the-dogmatic-notion-of-privatization〉
Florian Rötzer，2002/1/16," Ein europäisches Echelon? ",
〈http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/special/ech/11586/1.html〉
Patrick S. Poole, 1998. ECHELON: America's Secret Global Surveillance Network .Washingto, D.C.: Free Congress Foundation.
Richard Silverstein, 2014/2/9,”NSA Maintains Secret “Five Eyes” Satellite Facility in Israel” , RICHARDSILVERSTEIN,〈http://www.richardsilverstein.com/2014/02/09/nsa-maintains-satellite-facility-in-israel/〉
Richard Silverstein, 2014/2/10, “Secret NSA Satellite Facility Located at IDF Base in Occupied East Jerusalem”, LIVELEAK, 〈http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=a3f_1392383537〉
ADLER, Emanuel (1999). “O Construtivismo no Estudo das Relações Internacionais”, Lua Nova, vol. 47, pp. 201-252.
ADLER, Emanuel (2002). “Constructivism and International Relations”. In: Carlsnaes, W., RISSE, T., Simmons, B.A. Handbook of International Relations. London: SAGE Publications.
ALLAN, Pierre e DUPONT, Cédric (1999). “International Relations Theory and Game Theory: Baroque Modeling Choices and Empirical Robustness”, International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique, vol. 20, No. 1.
AUMANN. Robert. (1987), Game Theory. In The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, by Eatwell, J., Milgate, M. and Newman, P., London, Macmillan & Co.
AUMANN, Robert. (1989), Game Theory in Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P., The New Palgrave, New York: Norton.
AUMANN Robert e Dreze J. (2008). “Rational Expectations in Games”. American Economic Review, vol. 98, n.º1, pp. 72–86
BAYLIS, John. (1997), International Security in the Post-Cold War Era, in Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (eds), The Globalization of World Politics. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
BLANK, Stephen (1999). “Every shark east of Suez: great power interests, policies and tactics in Transcaspian energy wars”. Central Asian Survey, vol.18, n.º 2.
BOREL, Emile (1921). “La théorie du jeu et les equation intégrales à noyau symétrique gauche”, Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Sciences, vol. 173, pp. 1304-1308. English translation by L. J. Savage in Econometrica, vol. 21, pp. 97-100.
HECKEL, Jeffrey (1998). “The constructivist turn in International Relations theory”, World Politics, vol. 50, n.º 2, pp. 324-348.
COURNOT, Antoine-Augustin (1838). Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses, Paris: Hachette. English translation by Bacon, N. (1927). Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth. New York, MacMillan.
COX, Robert (1981). “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 10, n.º 2, pp. 124-155.
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HAFTENDORN, Helga (1991). “The security puzzle: theory-building and discipline-building in international security”. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, n.º1, pp. 3-17.
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KAGEL, John and ROTH, Alvin, eds. (1997), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton Univ. Press.
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