本文透過兩次台北市長選舉的「策略性」投票行為研究，來討論少數 群體（政黨與族群）在不確定情境下政治支持的決策機制，並探討表現在策略性 投票背後的動機為何；進一步則探索「少數」政治行動的理性基礎。透過個體模 型的建立與驗證，本文發現菁英特質與主流政黨的分合牽動了大眾的個別選擇， 也整合（coordinate）了群體政治支持的方向。

　　　　　Why do minority voters like to make political group commitment, and what effect does elite characteristics have on their choices under political uncertainty? Very little empirical research tries to answer these questions in a systematic way. This article examines patterns of minority politics and the underlying motivation of mass choice. I find that the elite's characteristics help minority voters make coordinated choice to signal their voices. I reach these conclusions by specifying and testing an individual-level model of minority choice, using as dependent variable the probability that New Party voters will vote for their candidates in 1994 and 1998 Taipei Mayoral Elections.