官僚裁量是公共行政領域中的重要與持續性議題。長期以來，論者即指出基層官僚人員亦因位處政策輸送末端，而握有公共資源配置與裁罰決定上可觀的裁量權，甚而被認定為是在從事「政策制定」的功能。儘管這類人員角色重要，但卻少有研究系統性地聚焦在探究如「官僚人格」與領導等變數，究竟如何影響渠等之行為。本文發展出一個官僚裁量的概念性架構。此架構是由官僚人格與領導兩個獨立變數所構成，試圖針對變數關係提出假設，並使用變異數分析與典型相關等統計方法來考驗假設。研究木部份支持了原先假設，本文將就其意涵提出說明。

Bureaucratic discretion is a crucial and continuing issue in the field of public administration. It has been suggested that the discretionary activity of street-level bureaucrats is central enough to regard street-level domains as policymaking. Although many recognize that street-level bureaucrats play a fundamental role in governing, few have systematically examined how variables such as “bureaucratic personalities” and leadership influence their behavior. This paper develops a conceptual framework of bureaucratic discretion. The framework is composed of two independent variables: (a) bureaucratic personalities, and (b) leadership. Methods such as “ANOVA” and “Canonical Correlation” are used to test hypotheses. The result of the test partly supports our hypotheses and the article has further explanation for it.