在2011年底的國家大選中，俄羅斯大城市的民眾因發現執政黨局涉嫌進行選舉舞弊，而發動了幾個月的大規模示威遊行。然而，三個月之後的政黨輪替不僅未如同「顏色革命」的經驗在俄羅斯發生，Putin與其政治伙伴 Dmitry Medvedev又再一次在民意的抉擇下，成功地交換彼此的政府職位。 本文欲提問的問題是：為何西方普遍認為Vladimir Putin統治下的俄羅斯出現「民主倒退」的跡象，Putin-Medvedev體制反倒出現穩固化的傾向，而未爆發類似顏色革命或北非「阿拉伯之春」的革命，其統治基礎何在？為何同屬半威權的俄羅斯在短期內缺乏發生顏色革命的條件？這一場運動何以來去匆匆？這半年來的運動是否撼動了Putin的統治基礎？如果沒有，又為什麼？本文主要從公民社會的孱弱、反對黨勢力被籠絡以及遭到割裂的面向，找出俄羅斯的選舉式威權主義體制能夠建立的社會與政治因素；同時從國家主義的俄羅斯國族身分認同中找到支持與鞏固Putin-Medvedev體制的意識型態因素，在這方面，抗議運動所展現出來的話語往往與造成俄羅斯經濟潰敗的親西方派類似，而難以獲得群眾支持。最後，從抗議政治的角度，分析俄羅斯這一次抗議活動的未竟之處，當中缺乏來自國內其它非大城市區域民眾以及跨領域抗議運動的支持為主要問題。先前缺乏在地方選舉中的組織動員經驗，使抗議人士在大選抗議中活脫像是嘉年華遊行中的群眾，也讓抗議活動僅停留在大都市而未能與其它廣大地區的社會運動結合，錯失了運動在地理區域上擴張的可能性。

At the end of the year 2011, citizens who live in Russia large cities found fraud which was manipulated by government in the State Duma election. They held protest, rallies and any kind of activities to show the anger and distrust of that regime for months. Surprisingly or not, Putin’s got his life time No. 3 landslide winning in the presidential election in March, 2012. Here are some inquiry needs to be clarified. As we knew that democratic backlash happened in Russia for a decade, not only Putin but also the general public seems quite calm before the protest. What are the main characteristics of Putin-Medvedev regime that stabilize the state and society nearly so fine, and why the “color revolutions” stopped at water’s edge? Did the protest movement from below shake the foundation of Russia political landscape, if not, why? I propose that the weakness of civil society and its NGO sectors that make them impotent to check and balance the state and political elites. And even more, Putin eliminated small political parties by law and make elections incompetent and uncompetitive. Opposition parties which cross the threshold of Duma election and get seats became so corrupt and sharing “administrative resources” as much as they can. That’s the reason why the street fighters for democracy and freedom going alone without the help from “established oppositions”. There is still an enigma why people still support Putin. I unpack the black box in a social constructivist way that emphasize Putin, and those before and after him, gave Russian a strong and prosperous national identity, which make people going back to the glorious days of “Big Russia” in comparison those who claim democracy are easily associated with the image of “small Russia” that full of miserable memories of shock therapy. I borrowed “electoral model” to investigate the prerequisites and processes in the street protest in the final paragraph. It’s interesting to compare the dynamic, process and consequences of Orange Revolution in Ukraine with the “New Decemberists” in Moscow and St, Petersburg. Lack of protest experiences and the skills of organizing the public, the “Just Protest” style make rallies carnival-like events and failed to link other social movements in the Russia territory and the missed “windows of opportunity” of social and political change.