為了理解現今土石流災害管理制度是否受到人民的支持？本文利用無母數Wilcoxon型態統計分析工具檢測受訪者之土石流災害意識與管理態度。結果顯示人民對於土石流災害的高度憂慮，也呈現人民對於現今土石流災害管理的不滿與期待。為了降低人民對土石流災害的憂慮與管理的不滿，我們必須尋求有效舒緩或預防土石流災害空間產生的管理制度。為了落實此規範性目標，我們則必須先理解土石流災害空間被誰和為何被生產此根本課題，相關研究或強調經濟個體是災害空間的生產者，或闡釋政府不當規劃與執行是災害空間的生產者。本文利用新制度經濟學範型，進一步指出制度才是災害空間的主要生產原料，主要論點係因為無效率的制度，導致高昂的交易成本扭曲了價格訊號的傳遞，致使土石流災害誘發者未能自動生產安全空間，結果使土石流危險區居住者被鎖住在災害空間的陷阱中。當釐清制度如何形塑土石流災害空間的問題後，我們在此基礎下進一步檢視土石流特定水土保持區管理制度。透過交易成本分析推論，顯示土石流特定水土保持區管理制度，雖然具有事前防衛效益並可避免部分的租利消散，但在未有縮減交易成本的輔助措施配合下，使得土石流特定水土保持區管理制度因高昂的資訊與蒐尋成本、協商與決策成本、及監督與執行成本，而呈現最適土石流危險區難以界定、劃定作業難以落實的問題。為了避免土石流特定水土保持區管理制度成為表象制度，本研究認為制度設計宜注意如何降低交易成本的問題。

Debris-flow is broadly recognized as a rapid flow of mixed material of debris, rock or mud with water. In Taiwan, the scale and frequency of debris-flow have been increasing for recent years, such as the serious damages of debris-flow disaster that occurred at Feng-Chiou, Tungmen and Six-Villages Kong etc. The major physical control factors of debris-flow are steep gradient, heavy water supply and unstable debris; nevertheless inadequate land use on hillsides will result in or deepen the adverse effects of debris-flow. Although researchers still debate debris-flow disaster management issues, they concern little about debris-flow disaster management from hillside land use planning, and little focus on what role institution and transaction costs play in debris flow disaster management instruments. To capture what citizens' debris-flow disaster management responses, this study adopts attitude surveys to analyzes debris-flow disaster perception and management attitudes with Wilcoxon-type and chi-square tests. Empirical results are as follow: The statistical tests indicate that debris-flow disaster perception significant higher important than hillside conservation, nuclear risk and farmland conservation, and that respondents preference of setting environmental standards over environmental taxes. In terms of management satisfaction and intent, respondents fell dissatisfaction and consider should adopt more strict regulatory instruments than current regulating activities. In Addition, this study incorporates the "new institutional economics" paradigm to emphasize the role of institution and transaction costs in the investigation of debris-flow disaster management, to re-examine the management issues of the debris-flow special water-soil conservation areas, and to propose debris-flow disaster management policy implicatopns. This paper indicate that the production of debris-flow disaster space was caused by institutional forces, that unable to realize the management objective for the debris-flow special water-soil conservation areas was caused by search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and enforcement costs. In order to realize the effective management objective, one important institutional way for the debris-flow disaster management to do this is by lowering transaction costs.