一、中文部份
中華民國區域科學學會（1991），台灣省都市計畫公共設施保留地建設管理之研究，台中：台灣省政府建設廳。
中華民國都市計畫學會（1987）。都市計畫公共設施保留地解決對策之研究，台北：台灣，內政部營建署
內政部(1954)，台灣省市政建設考察小組報告書，台北：內政部。
內政部(1984)，辦理加強推動公共設施保留地取得計畫總報告，台北：內政部。
內政部(1988)，都市計劃法部分條文修正草案立法委員可能質詢問題及答詢稿，台北：內政部營建署。
內政部秘書室(1978)，「我國都市計劃制定程序之研究」收錄於六十六年度內政業務研究報告，台北：內政部秘書室。
王濟昌（1979），都市公共設施保留地之研究，台中：台灣省政府研考會。
台灣省政府（1995），台灣光復五十年專輯-經濟發展的回顧與展望，台北：台灣省政府新聞處。
台灣省政府究考會(1979)，都市公共設施保留地之研究，台中：台灣省政府研考會。
立法院秘書處(1988)，都市計畫法修正案，台北：立法院公報印刷所。
立法院圖書館(1988)，公共設施保留地，台北：立法院圖書館。
行政院經建會(1979)，十項重要建設評估，台北：行政院經濟建設委員會。
行政院經建會都市規劃處（1976），公共設施保留地取得之研究，台北：行政院經濟建設委員會。
吳介英(1987)，公共設施保留地取得問題：公共政策分析，東海學報第二十八卷，頁415-430
李瑞麟(1983)，都市計畫法檢討研究，國立政治大學學報，第四十三期﹔頁83-115。
來璋(1974)，台灣公共設施保留地問題。台北：台灣商務印書館。
林全（1992），我國統籌分配稅的演變與其對中央及地方財政關係的探討，台北：行政院國科會。
姚榮齡（1977），台灣省改進都市計劃業務之研究，台中：台灣省政府研究發展考核委員會。
張景森(1993)，台灣的都市計畫：1895-1988，台北：台灣:業強出版社。
張隆盛(1987)，都市計劃法部分條文修正草案有關公共設施保留地專題報告，台北：內政部營建署。
張隆盛(1979)，都市建設捐可行辦法之研究，台北：內政部。
許介麟(1989)，政黨政治的秩序與倫理，台北：國家政策資料研究中心。
陳忠信(1989)，國家政策與批判的公共論述，台北：國家政策資料研究中心。陳承鐘(1975)，實施都市計劃與都市建設財源。
彭懷恩(1987)，台灣政治變遷四十年，台北：自立晚報出版社。
彭懷恩(1995)，台灣發展的政治經濟分析，台北：風雲論壇出版社。曾濟群(1996)，中華民國憲政法治與政黨關係，台北：五南圖書出版公司。
黃世鑫（1989），我國各級政府經濟功能劃分協調及地方財政問題，台北：財政部賦稅改革委員會。
黃朝陽(1981)，論都市計劃公共設施保留地問題之解決，土地改革月刊，第三十一卷第十一期，頁41-45。
黃萬翔(1986)，「台灣地區都市計畫實施成效與展望」收錄於光復四十年來都市計畫之回顧與展望，台北：中華民國都市計畫學會。
蔡吉源(1991)，台灣政治經濟評論選-公共選擇與政經決策，臺北:天一出版社。
蕭正祥(1990)，台北市取得公共設施保留地政策執行之研究，政治大學公共行政研究所碩士論文
蕭全政(1988)，政治與經濟的整合-政治經濟學的理論基礎，臺北：桂冠。蘇志超(1987)，公共設施保留地與公共設施用地之分析比較，國立政治大學學報，第五十六期﹔.87-111。
二、英文部份
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Brams, S. J. & Kilgour, D. M. (1986), Notes on Arms Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, in Avenhaus, R., Huber, R. K. and Kettelle, J. D.(eds.), Modeling and Analysis in Arms Control, Springer-Verlag, 409-419
Buchanan, J. M. (1972), Politics, Property, and the Law：An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et. Al. v. Schoene, Journal of Law and Economics, 15：439-452
Calvert, Randall L.(1987), Reputation and legislative leadership, Public Choice,55, 81-119.
Coase, R.H. (1988), The Firm, The Market and the Law, University of Chicago Press.
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