在都市計畫政策制訂過程中，國家頒佈各種行政命令或法規來規範社會活動的主體，以確保都市土地的合理使用。然而都市計畫在臺灣社會的產出與影響，似乎超出了合理使用的範圍，一向最為人所詬病。對於都市計畫政策的扭曲，筆者為其合法化的過程中，明顯的體現了行動者與制度相互操弄的特性，特別是在審議機制的運作上。本文旨趣置於制度與行動者於都市計畫審議機制的互動邏輯：立基對前人國土政策與都市計畫體系相關研究的反省，企圖運用歷史制度論作為本文分析的工具，進一步探討都市計畫審議機制的制度架構：政策制訂過程有關包含了哪些法規制度，這些制度法定程序為何？運作邏輯為何？又如何設定行動者的進入到政策場域的門檻？如何影響行動者的策略？而行動者又如何在制度環境下展現其利益？本文並以臺中市為例，繼之以檢證是否符合行動者與制度相互操弄的思考邏輯。 本文運用文獻分析與深度訪談的路方法探討上述的問題，蒐集了臺中市第七十九年度至九十年度都市計畫委員會的委員名單及資本資料，以及有關都市計畫審議的法定計畫的主要因素有其穩定性與特殊性，其過程是不能忽視政治與權力之問題。進言之，都市計畫的運作是依附在家制度的「正當性」下進行真實空間的規劃工作，所面對的是空間使用的指派，其所連結的利益價值，讓整個過程充滿利益的對抗，並因此塑造出社會不公平與資源重分配的價值觀。

The purpose of this research attempts to analyze the operational logic of the valuation mechanism of urban planning institution in Taichung city from 1990 to 2001 with the historical institutionalism perspective. Two questions are focused on in this study: (1) Are institutions the medicine to solve problems of urban planning? What’s the role of local government in this mechanism? (2) The interactions between actors and institutional structures- why and how do organizations and individuals conform to institutions? The historical institutionalism provides an insight that how the institutional arrangements shape human interactions, and what are the ways for the actors to manipulate institutions to express their interests under the structure of institutions. Literature reviews and in-depth interviews are applied to uncover the above questions. In this paper, the member lists of valuation committee of urban planning institution from 1990 to 2001 in Tachung city and other related laws or academic literatures are collected. By reviewing the statutory procedures of implementing the urban plan, I find that the mayor owns the great majority of power in the institution. Furthermore, I interpret the data from interviewing, actors such as the local government, city councilors, local factions, developers and real estators join the action collations to manipulate institutions for their interests. In addition, the establishing of action coalitions is a process of institutionalization and formulation of a stable policy domain. In this field, the actors’ behavior be constrained, and they must conform to the customary norm, belief system in the policy network and institutional environment. In other words, they must obey the rules of games to take strategies on the times of veto points. Finally, within a debate between the historical institutionalism and the empirical data in case study, I find the evidence of the phenomena which is inter-manipulating between actors and institutions.