Analysing variations of Taiwanese capital invested in the sugar industry before and after the Japan-Russian War (1904-1905), the author contends that what constituted 'Taiwanese capital' was mainly the capital accumulated by Taiwanese landlord gentry then. Prior to the War, 'Proposals for Reforming the Sugar Industry' initiated by Nitobei Ianzo had already been put into practice by the colonial government in Taiwan. However, since the price of sugar was low and the Taiwanese peasantry did not have confidence in the colonial ruler, these proposals were neffective, reformations centring upon Taiwanese landlord gentry therefore were brought in. In the wake of the War, Japanese capitals originally invested in Japan's domestic sugar sector rushed to Taiwanese sugar industry. This occurred because of three factors: there was a boom of Japanese stock market, the sugar taxation was conducive to Taiwanese sugar and the colonial government in Taiwan provided new incentives to boost the sugar industry. In consequence, as Modern Sugar Works owned by the Japanese capital burgeoned, the Taiwanese capital, constrained by the System of Loku-San-Ho (No. 63 Law) limiting its investments, could only stick to Formosa Reformed Sugar Works and thus appeared 'retreating'.