荀子在道德實踐論上，並不重視「性」，並不將性視為人之所以異於禽獸者；人之哲學理解的關鍵在於「心」。心的主要意義為「認知義」和「自主義」，可合而為一更為豐富之「解蔽心」。解蔽心與性的關係，即在於以心治性、化性起偽。解蔽心之所以能如此，乃因解蔽心具「虛」、「壹」、「靜」三大功能，為一大清明之心；加之其涵具認知義及自主義，即可以「道」作為認知對象，並以達於「道」作為認知的最終目的。「道」即「人之所以道」、「君子之道」，其實質為「禮義」，為道德實踐的客觀、外在、具權威性的判準。解蔽心「知道」之後，進而「可道」、「守道以禁非道」，由知至行，顯示道德實踐必須以道德知識論為其基礎。解蔽心作為人之哲學理解及道德知識論的核心概念，實一與「性」有別且治性之心；且為一「理性心」，同時兼含認知與自主 (相當於理智與意志)。然「道」高於解蔽心之上，為權衡的最高判準，「道」源於聖人積思慮、習偽故之創制。問題是：創制「道」的第一個聖人如何可能﹖荀子並未予以回答或解決，這就形成荀學根源性之難題。

　　　　　In the realm of moral practice, Hsun tzu is not so concerned with the idea of “nature” (hsing); this is not what separates man from the beasts. The key to understanding the philosophy of man is in the “mind” (hsin). The meaning of mind lies in an”epistemology” and a “subject”. Combined these create a “Chieh-pi-hsin”. The relationship between this “chieh-pi-hsin” and “hsing” then lies in the “hsin chih hsing” and “hua hsing chi wei”. Concretely speaking, the “Tao” could be said to be the epistemological object of this “chieh-pi-hsin” and also the goal of the epistemology. This “Tao” is a “Humanistic Tao”, a “Superior Man's Tao”; its essence is in “propriety” (liyi). It is an objective, external and authoritative standard of moral practice. One can know and implement the “Tao” through this “chieh -pi-hsin”. It is obvious however, that the implementation of a moral practice is in need of a moral epistemology as a base. The “chieh -pi-hsin” is the kernel of understanding a philosophy of man and a moral epistemology. Finally, “Tao” transcends this “chieh-pi-hsin” as an external, authoritative standard. “Tao” is what the sage considers in creating his authority. The problem remains though of how the first sage was able to accomplish this. Hsun tzu never completely explained this and it has become a problem of genesis in the subsequent study of Hsun Tzu.