為了避免重蹈1980年代國庫財政赤字的覆轍，國會於1996年4月9日通過了《款項否決權法》，並經由William J. Clinton簽署施行。依據該法，總統得以針對預算法案之個別款項進行否決，遏止國會議員以「肉桶立法」與「滾木立法」方式挾帶預算法案。1997年Clinton總統開始使用款項否決權，隨後控告《款項否決權法》違憲的訴訟接踵而來，紐約州首先控告Clinton總統取消紐約州為醫療健保而附加的稅款為違憲。聯邦最高法院於1998年4月27日對本案受理審查，在6月25日做出最後判決，以六比三之票數宣告款項否決權違反憲法規定；主要理由如下：款項否決權破壞《憲法》原有的行政與立法權力平衡機制，國會不得將部分立法權，訂立新法予以授權總統更改國會已通過之法律，因此宣告違憲。本文將透過Clinton v. City of New York案件，探討款項否決權憲法之爭端始末及其政治影響。

In order to avoid recommitting the financial deficits that the American government had made in the 1980s, the Congress enacted the Line Item Veto Act in 1996. According to the Act, presidents are empowered to veto budgetary items including discretionary budget authorities, new direct expenditures, and even limited tax benefits. In addition, presidents could take advantage of the line item veto to restrain congressmen from pork-barrel legislations or logrolling. In 1997, President William J. Clinton started to exercise the line item veto, and subsequently the litigation of unconstitutionality followed. In Clinton v. City of New York (1998), the Supreme Court held that the procedures of cancellation in the Act had violated the Presentment Clause and the principle of separation of powers as well. In this study, we elaborate the controversial issues of the line item veto, and then review two lawsuits PresidentClinton was involved in to examine whether the Line Item Veto Act would violate the Presentment Clause and the principle of separation of powers. With this end in mind, we evaluate the political consequences of presidential line item veto, and conclude this article by offering some perspectives on presidential veto power.