本文主要的目的是論證出，黑格爾與龍樹在批判一般的形上學時所依據的觀點是一致的。假如一般的形上學堅持有一個「無限」的事物，可以在質的方面是有別於一個「有限」的事物，並且認定唯有前者才是唯一值得追求的對象，那麼此種觀點終將難逃黑格爾與龍樹的批判。從兩者所持的原理 (變異與緣起) 出發，所謂的「有限」與「無限」的真實關像一定是既相異，也統一。所以，一般形上學把兩者完全割裂的做法是不符合事實的情況。

　　　　　The main purpose of this paper is to argue that Hegel and Nagarjuna based their respective criticisms of general metaphysics on concordant views. If general metaphysics insists on positing something `infinite', qualitatively different from finite things, and takes it to be the only object worth pursuing, then such a view would hardly escape the criticisms set forth by Hegel and Nagarjuna. In the light of the principles - becoming and dependent arising - upheld by both of them, the so-called true relationship between the finite and the infinite must be both unitary and divergent. Thus, the dichotomy between finitude and infinitude affirmed by general metaphysics does not accord with facts.