印度中觀學派的龍樹開展了「無自性」、「空」等中觀學義理，而漢傳三論宗「解空第一」的僧肇，則透過道家的術語詮釋來自印度的中觀學。本研究目的在探討龍樹與僧肇如何看待「變遷」此一議題，分別聚焦於龍樹的時間哲學和僧肇的物性觀，以及討論其關於時間或變遷的論證方法之差異。關於龍樹的時間哲學，本論文將以《中論．去來品》和《中論．觀時品》作為討論基礎。龍樹在《中論．去來品》以「三世」的時間架構，對「運動」以語意學、存有學進行分析，解構運動、運動者和運動時間的實在性。而《中論．觀時品》雖亦否定時間的實在性，更認為時間在認識論具有重要意義。關於僧肇的文本則以〈物不遷論〉來討論其物性哲學，其提出一個將時間與事物視為一個整體為「時間—事物」的存在論架構，並將時間流切為「今」與「昔」兩個不同的階段，批判了時間流下的事物同一性或實體主義的觀點，發揮其「不遷」、「靜而非動」的物性論。最後，本文針對僧肇文本中的部分語彙，雖可能會也引發了事物、因果、時間序列下的斷見式的解讀。不過，透過僧肇整體文脈的理解與其他詮釋者的觀點，可以理解其借用道家思想中的「動、靜」、「有、無」概念所闡述的物性論仍是中觀式的存有學。

Nāgārjuna, the founder of Indian mādhyamaka school, exerted mādhyamika philosophy concerning thoughts about śūnyatā and niḥsvabhāva. And the Chinese Buddhism master Sengzhao who was the best interpreter of emptiness used terms of Taoism to interpret mādhyamika philosophy from Indian. This article attempts to discuss the philosophy of ＂changing＂ of Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao, besides comparing the philosophies and arguments of Nāgārjuna's view of time and Sengzhao's view about nature of things. On Nāgārjuna's philosophy of ＂time＂, the article will analyze the Chapter 2 and Chapter 19 in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. In Chapter 2, Nāgārjuna uses three time divisions, semantics and ontology to analyze ＂movement＂ while negating the reality of movement, mover and time of movement. In Chapter 19, Nāgārjuna also negates the reality of time and regards time as the vital significance in the epistemology. However, Sengzhao analyzes his viewpoint about nature of thing in ＂Wu buqian lun＂ 物不遷論. He regards the time and thing as a whole construction-＂time-thing＂ ontological construction, and divides the time into ＂now＂ and ＂past＂ stages. And then Sengzhao criticizes the identity of things or the realism. He cliams all things are ＂stirless＂ but not ＂moving＂. Finally, this article will focus on some discourses in Sengzhao's texts which may lead to a ＂fracture＂ interpretation of things, cause and effect, and time sequence, though. Through understanding of overall context of Sengzhao's texts and other interpreters' views, we may understand that Sengzhao's interpretation about nature of things has ＂borrowed＂ such terms as ＂moving＂, ＂stirless＂, ＂being＂ and ＂not being＂ from Taoism thought, and is somewhat similar to the ontology thought of Indian mādhyamaka school.