本文主要透過新制度主義的觀點，探討南韓現行憲政體制下總統與國會間的關係。研究發現，南韓的憲政體制雖較接近美國總統制，但韓國總統的權力卻較美國總統大。而在制度設計上，特殊的總統單任制、沒有副總統，以及內閣總理的設計，使得南韓總統在職權行使上，受到更多的制度牽制。而受到特殊的地域、政黨結構影響，使得南韓國會經常陷入「朝小野大」的席次分配，在野黨往往可以利用總理同意權、彈劾追訴權及議事癱瘓的策略，來與總統職權對抗，一旦總統無法掌握多數，往往形成政治僵局。

This study examines the relationship between the president and the National Assembly in the current South Korean constitutional system from the perspective of neo-institutionalism. According to research findings, although the constitutional system of South Korea is close to the U.S. presidential system, the powers wielded by the president of South Korea are nevertheless greater than those of his/her U.S. counterpart. In terms of the institutional design, the unique single-term system, the absence of the position of vice-president and the role of the premier all impose further institutional restrictions on the exercise of power by the South Korean president. Under the influence of special regional considerations and political party structures, it often occurs that ＂the ruling party has a minority of seats while the opposition party has the majority of seats＂ in the South Korean National Assembly, which enables the opposition to resist the president by exercising its power to approve the appointment of the premier, to initiate impeachments and prosecutions, as well as to paralyze the National Assembly. Once the president no longer enjoys majority support in the National Assembly, a political stalemate is inevitable.