Implementation of environmental policies affects deeply related benefits of the general public, but when faced with environmental governance issues the current governmental system in Taiwan makes related policies and proposes monitoring measures solely through executive administrations, biased toward the technical aspects of these issues whereas failing to adopt the opinions of the general public to review and revise the policy contents. In a democratic system, policy making and implementation should reflect the general public’s preferences in order to fulfill the principle of democracy. Social choice is derived from a collective point of view in order to make decisions related to public goods. It can not only resolve environmental issues, but also achieve decision outcomes representing the preferences of the majority of individuals. Social choice thus incorporates the principle of democracy into collective decisions. The vole-trading, representative government system proposed by Haefele (1973) can be used to resolve the social choice issues of environmental management, suggesting that through representatives in place of their constituents to make direct decisions related to environmental issues with vote-trading under the majority rule, the collective outcome is consisted with that through direct democracy. The present paper is grounded on the social choice mechanism proposed by Huefele (1973), applies that mechanism to environmental governance in Taiwan, conducts an experiment to explore the feasibility of such mechanism, and complements Haefele's deductive proof that when representatives are allowed to trade votes, the collective decision outcome is consistent with that derived from direct voting by the assembly of individuals.