本文主要探討明代朱子學者羅整菴（名欽順，1465-1547）與陽明學者歐陽南野（名德，1496-1554）的重要論辯，論辯的主題聚焦於「良知」與「知覺」兩個概念上，並涉及朱子學與陽明學的理論差異。羅整菴謹守朱子學心性論的義理間架，嚴分「心性之辨」，以「知覺」來理解陽明所謂的「良知」，將陽明的「良知即天理」視之爲「以知覺爲性」，力辯「良知非天理」。相對地，歐陽南野善於掌握陽明「體用一源」的辯證思維，說明「良知」與「知覺」二者「不離不雜」的關係，反對「以知覺爲良知」，申明「良知即天理」。如此一來，就命題的形式而言，羅整菴的「良知非天理」與歐陽南野的「良知即天理」，便形成對立矛盾的命題。這一組對立矛盾的命題，也涵蓋另一組對立矛盾的命題。即羅整菴的「良知非天理」，其論據在於「以良知爲知覺」；而南野的「良知即天理」，其論據則在於「良知非知覺」。如是，「良知即知覺」與「良知非知覺」也是對立矛盾的命題。若將二組命題連結表述，羅整菴的立論就是：良知即知覺而非天理；歐陽南野的主張則是：良知即天理而非知覺。本文藉由分析論辯雙方的理據，使朱子學與陽明學的理論預設，充分顯示出來。本文也指出：此論辯意味著朱子學、陽明學對主體（心是知覺或是良知）與本體（天理）的看法，有其根本的差異。猶有進者，若從中國哲學史脈絡或東亞儒學的視域來看，「良知與知覺」之辯是一豐富的哲學論題，值得關注。

This paper examines the important debate conducted by Luo Zhengan (1465-1547), a master of the Zhu Xi school, and Ouyang Nanye (1496-154), a scholar of the (Wang) Yang-Ming school, during the Ming dynasty. Luo and Ouyang debated on the ideas of liangzhi (original knowing) and zhijue (the faculty of representation), which also implicated theoretical differences between the Zhu Xi and Yang-Ming schools of Neo-Confucianism. Luo, closely following the theoretical structure of Zhu Xi's idea of xinxing (mind-nature), made a rigid distinction between mind and nature. He interpreted Yang-ming's liangzhi in terms of zhijue, identified Yang-ming's liangzhi being tianli (the heavenly principle) with "treating zhijue as nature," and argued vehemently that "liangzhi and tianli are far from one and the same thing." In contrast, Ouyang was well-versed in Yang-ming's dialectical thinking that "both substance and function come from the same source." By clarifying the relationship of liangzhi and zhijue being inseparable and immiscible, he was opposed to "treating zhijue as liangzhi." "Liangzhi and tianli are one and the same thing," Ouyang contended. As a result, we have found in the debate two contradictions. One concerns the relationship between liangzhi and tianli; that is, Luo's "liangzhi and tianli being far from one and the same thing" contradicts Ouyang's "liangzhi and tianli being one and the same thing." The other contradiction resides in what underlies the above two propositions. Justifying their respective positions regarding liangzhi and tianli, Luo appealed to "identifying liangzhi with zhijue," and Ouyang denied "liangzhi being zhijue." This paper intends to fulfill three objectives: First, to disclose the theoretical presuppositions of the Zhu Xi and Yang-Ming schools; secondly, to indicate the fundamental differences in understanding the subject (whether mind being zhijue or liangzhi) and the ontological substance (tianli) between Zhu Xi and Yang-Ming schools; thirdly, to suggest that, in the context of either the history of Chinese philosophy or East Asian Confucianism, this debate on liangzhi and zhijue is a philosophical topic rich in contents and worthy of more attention.