鑑於府際關係的意涵及其議題具有學理的重要性與實際政治的參考價值，本研究從政黨政治的觀點切入，旨在探討我國中央政府與臺北、高雄兩直轄市政府的府際關係。詳言之，本研究嘗試比較中央和地方行政首長為同一政黨所掌握的「垂直式一致政府」（vertical unified government），與中央和地方行政首長分別為不同政黨所掌握的「垂直式分立政府」（vertical divided government），其政治運作有何明顯差異？換言之，相較「垂直式一致政府」型態，「垂直式分立政府」架構之下的府際關係，是否會因為政黨立場不同，造成中央與地方政府之間陷入意識形態的對立與僵局？舉例來說，中央統籌分配款項的設置目的在於解決地方財政問題，然而其分配方式，可能因為中央政府與地方行政首長分屬不同政黨，造成諸多爭議。因此，本研究以1995年1月至2003年6月期間，《聯合報》與《新新聞》等傳播媒體對於府際關係的報導，評析雙方之間的對立情形與合作互動。經由實證分析所得到的初步結論，「垂直式一致政府」之府際關係確實較為平順與和諧，而「垂直式分立政府」的府際互動則較易產生齟齬與對峙。就研究性質而言，本文僅定位為一「初探研究」（pilot study），或可視為未來研究的奠石。當然，政黨政治與府際關係牽涉我國民主發展甚鉅，係值得研究者持續關注的議題。

In view of its theoretical and practical political implications, this pilot study focuses on the intergovenmental relations between the national and local authorities in Taiwan. Employing the perspective of party politics, we empirically examine the interactions of the central government with Taipei's and Kaohsiung's municipal governments in terms of the political consequences of vertically divided government and vertically unified government. Vertically divided government exists when the central and local governments are controlled by different political parties. On the contrary, vertically unified government implies that both the national and local governments are under the control of the same major political party. By analyzing the news dataset of the United Daily News and the Journalist from January 1995 to June 2003, we examine the effects of vertically divided and unified government on the political interactions between the central and municipal governments. The findings have by and large confirmed the research hypothesis that vertically divided government seems to lead to stalemate, inefficiency, and dysfunctional politics between the central and municipal governments, while vertically unified government tends to makes responsible and efficient governing an attainable goal. We conclude that vertically divided government is a field worthy of continued research by Taiwan's political scientists.