摘 要 八二三砲戰後不久，美國駐台北政治參事歐斯本(David L. Osborn) 向國務院指出：國民黨因為最近改變了「反攻大陸」的立場，故在宣傳 上調整政黨的理論基礎；並指出國府與國民黨內外「對此調整的接受度， 可能在以下幾年對本地的政局會有決定性的影響。」國府當時是否真的 改變了「反攻大陸」的立場或政策？還是只改變了「說法」？本文探討 了砲戰對「反攻大陸」宣傳的影響，指出：砲戰確實在反攻宣傳中注入 了幾個新的元素。首先，砲戰前以軍事反攻為主、引發大陸抗暴為輔的 宣傳，逐漸轉變成以「公社暴政」激發大陸抗暴為主，軍事反攻為輔； 亦即「軍事第一」的「武力反攻」，轉變成「主義為前鋒，武力為後盾」 的「政治反攻」。其次，反攻在宣傳中從立即的目標變成長期的任務。 最後，反攻宣傳結合了〈中美聯合公報〉內的文化元素，以及「人民公 社」內反民族傳統的宣傳，為「自由中國」注入了保護民族傳統與文化 的元素，讓「自由中國」逐漸變成「文化中國」。本文指出反攻宣傳的 轉彎是逐漸的，每個轉變都經過黨政仔細評估決定。反攻大陸雖看來未 執行，但卻是蔣介石與國府認定的「存在的理由」，故砲戰雖改變了反 攻大陸的「說法」，卻未改變國府這個基本國策與執行的決心。

Abstract In the wake of the second Taiwan Strait crisis, David L. Osborn, U.S. Political Consular in Taipei, reported to the State Department that the Kuomintang had modified its basic political doctrine of “return to the mainland,” which might impact local politics. Did the Nationalist government really change its policy or only its “presentation” of the policy? This article focuses on the propaganda aspects of the policy, concluding that there were indeed new elements after the crisis. First, although the Kuomintang did not change its ultimate goal, the principle means shifted from military to political ones. Second, the “sacred mission” was presented as a long-term, instead of an immediate, effort. Third, propaganda attacking the evils of communism was supplemented with notions of preserving Chinese culture and heritage; thus did “free China” gradually make a cultural turn. These modifications were made through careful evaluation; none were hasty decisions nor compelled by the United States. Still, the “return to the mainland” policy remained a statement of real intention, not merely a claim to legitimacy, and military preparations were not abandoned.