摘 要 「以儒家思想為本的中國文化可以接受西方現代科學嗎？」是二十世紀 新儒家企圖解決的一個核心問題。他們的解決方案是牟宗三著名的「科學開 出論」，亦即主張科學必須從中國文化內部、即儒家思想本身發展出來（開 出）。這套科學開出論預設了一個道德形上學的學說，包含一個「先驗道德 界」與「經驗現象界」的二分架構。本文爭論這套形上學不相容於現代科學 發展的形上學條件，因此無法支持科學開出論，進而我們可由此申論儒學與 中國傳統文化無能力發展出現代科學，雖然它已經產生中國傳統科學。最後 本文想指出，當代台灣哲學家要面對的問題不再是「中國文化與科學的關 係」，而是「在現代科技的衝擊下，什麼是中國文化」的新問題。

Abstract The key question which new Confucians in the twentieth century attempted to solve is “Can Confucianism-based Chinese culture adopt Western modern science?” Their program is Mou Zhongsan’s distinguished “Kei-Chu-Lun,” which claims that modern science must be dialectically developed out of, but not be transplanted to, Confucianism-based Chinese culture. The theory presupposes a doctrine of moral metaphysics, which implies a dichotomy between “the kingdom of a priori morality” and “the kingdom of a posteriori phenomena”. In this paper, I argue that the metaphysical doctrine is incompatible to ontological conditions by which modern science could be produced. Therefore, it fails in supporting “Kei-Chu-Lun.” I also argue that Confucianism-based Chinese culture has no capability to develop Western modern science, although it has produced Chinese traditional science. Finally, I want to point out that the key problem with which contemporary philosophers in Taiwan should deal is rather “what is Chinese culture when it has been transformed by modern science andtechnology” than “what is the relationship between modern science and Chinese culture.”