本論文試圖由《孟子．離婁》下「天下之言性也」章再疏解，解明孟子所力闢的論性路向之疏失，以及其所代表儒家的論性原則。包括兩部分，其所以並論之故，基於兩點相關性：皆關於中國人性論的路向，且同時涉及人性論的表法。 1 重新疏解《孟子》〈離婁〉下第26 章，主要透過句式文脈之分析，以決定歷來未決之章旨與字義；再從其中抽繹孟子所批評一般論性路向，及其中隱含的謬誤，即由人的後天習得、社會規範、目的性行動等論人性，實則這些層面僅是人以「利」為思考方式的一偏向而已。不論觀察者或被觀察者，都是心智之對象性施用。 2 由第一節的考察，進論孟子論性的原則，歸結至論性乃基於心之無對性與超越性，故在表法而言：「性」乃一實踐之動能字，「善」也是後設地絕對性之詞，非客觀定性詞。「性善」斷非指涉客觀的事件，亦非自事件抽繹歸納，故不可由「智之對象性施用」而理解或得證，此可與前節相發明。

The study deals with what Mencian “Li-lou” (II) chapter 26 refutes as the erroneous argument on “hsing (or xing, 性)” and what unfolds in this chapter as the Confucian “hsing” theory. This discussion includes two sections. The first part seeks to reveal the generally held fallacies by means of a syntactic analysis of the “Li-lou” chapter. In other words, it is a stereotypical perspective produced by an obsession with advantages to say that “hsing” is educated after birth, a kind of social imperative, or an act of teleology. Both the perceiver and the perceived are contextualized within a milieu of relativity. The second part of the study argues that Mencian “hsing” discourse is embedded on the non-relativity and transcendency of the mind. “Sing” thus indicates a dynamic practice, and “shan” is a meta-absolute rather than objective stereotyped term. Inasmuch as “hsing-shan” does not refer to the objective fact, an approach typical of relativity provides no access to its reality.