摘要 本文批判地檢視朱熹對老子哲學的理解，旨在論證朱熹強力反駁老子哲 學乃出於種種誤解。在倫理方面，本文指出：朱熹指控老子哲學反倫理、害 倫理，其實訴諸指摘老子人品，缺乏理論的意義與討論的價值，並出於對老 子哲學「正言若反」的思考與書寫方式的誤解。其次，在形上層面，朱熹駁 斥《老子》「有生於無」，並未公平對待後者的「有」「無」概念，唯獨肯 定《老子》「谷神」一章有啟發性。依陳榮捷的詮釋：朱熹看重此章，乃因 程頤對天地何以生生，與理本體何以有生生之用，並未有清楚闡明，且朱熹 藉由此章之谷神能生的觀念代為闡明，於是就朱熹而言，理學之生生觀念有 得於老子。本文則論證反駁：程頤對生生自有其清楚的說明，朱熹之代擬實 無必要，且僅就朱熹哲學自身才需要《老子》谷神觀念。

Abstract This paper philosophically criticizes Zhu Xi’s understanding of the philosophy of Laozi. In moral aspect, committing the fallacy of appealing to character or ad hominem, Zhu Xi accused Laozi of ethical nihilism and ignored the dialectically paradoxical way of Laozi’s own thinking and writing. So Zhu Xi’s moral critique of Laozi lacked theoretical significance. In ontology, owing to his misconception of “Being” and “Non-being” in the philosophy of Laozi, Zhu Xi objected to Laozi’ s thesis that Being comes from Non-being. However, he can fully appreciate the 6th chapter of the book Laozi instead. According to Wing-tsit Chan’s interpretation, Zhu Xi’s appreciation had its origin that Cheng Yi did not ever account for the creativity of Li (or Principle) so that Zhu Xi appropriated this chapter to amend the philosophical deficiency. Furthermore, Chan claims that Neo-Confucianism unexpectedly acquired the idea of creativity from Laozi’s philosophy. By contrast, this paper argues for the opposite side of Chan’s interpretation, and concludes that Chan cannot justify his judgment.􀀡􀀡