王弼與象性情論之內容，與二者構設的「擬聖」進路有著密切的關聯性。關於「性」與「情」的內涵與特質，王、郭看法大致相同，差異在於處理「情」的態度。王弼崇道本，郭象論物齊，各自開出治情之方。王弼主張「性其情」，郭象則謂「適性稱情」，二者觀點不同，但於性情論中均給予「情」存在的合理性。凡人依循二說，約制或超越「情」，幾可近於聖境。雖然王、郭玄論立基於氣化的宇宙論，必將導致聖者乃生而能，非可學致的結果；但是二人在性情論上，仍提供凡庶修養的途徑，縱使非即是聖，卻已貼近、擬似聖境。 文末，由史傳進行察，論證學行衝突反有助於二人在理論上的突破。並對王、郭所處的歷史場域進行了解，以發掘二人學說能有轉進的契機，皆與魏晉時代的共識有關。希冀透過本論文研究，可對王、郭玄論有著更深刻的論述。

In the Chinese intellectual tradition, discourses on xing (nature) and qing (feeling) are often closely related to the practical approaches that thinkers propose for the pursuit of moral perfection. Wang Bi (226-249) and Guo Xiang (died 312) hold more or less the same view about the content and characteristics of the notions of xing and qing. However, they differ from each other in their attitudes toward how to approach qing in practice. Wnag Bi considers the tao (way) to be the primal principle, whereas Guo Xiang argues for the equality of things (qiwu). This philosophical difference leads to their divergence in the practical approach to qing. Wang Bi suggests the approach of “xing qiqing” (restraining feeling in accord with nature); by contrast, Guo Xiang advices man to “shixing chengging” (express feeling in accord with nature). Despite this divergence, both Wang and Guo acknowledge the legitimacy of qing in their discourses on xing and qing. Therefore, following their teachings, weather through restraining or transcending qing, one is able to hold onto some concrete methods to conduct moral cultivation. To be sure, the qi (ether) cosmology upheld by Wang and Guo has the unmistakable implication that a saint must be borne, i.e., sainthood cannot be attained by pure learning. Still both thinkers do provide common people with approachable methods to pursue the ideal of moral perfection: in the end, although not everyone may achieve sainthood, an approximate level remains, at least potentially, always within one’s reach. The article also examines the biographical backgrounds of Wang and Guo in order to shed new light on the significance of the conflicts between their though and action. It is argued that such conflicts actually contribute to their theoretical breakthroughs. A historical account is further provided in order to show that the intellectual consensus of Wei-Jin period is indispensable for the breakthroughs made by Wang and Guo. Hopefully, this study will yield new insights into both the prevalent predicament of Wei-Jin intellectuals and the thoughts of Wang and Guo.