陸象山心學，是對於道德規範肯定意志的立法作用。這是孟子學傳統之繼承。在象山哲學，心是指善意志，則是指道德意志，而理是心所決定的自己活動的方向。道德實踐時，心必然地向善，心的向善活動有兩種意義，一者是對於是非善惡的判斷，另一者是好善惡惡的情感，或是著善去惡的活動，前者是指良知的作用，後者是良能的作用。良知良能是心所本具有的本質作用，因此心是道德立法者，亦是道德實踐的根本動力。對於道德價值的自覺是道德實踐之始，而擴充於向外以感應於對象，完成對象之存在價值，同時與對象為一體，是道德實踐的終，因此非但能肯定心生理，亦能肯定心生物，或者把象山之心即理哲學稱為主觀的唯心論，但這是不妥當的看法，因為象山哲學並不屬於認識論體系，並且象山從來並不否定客觀存在物的實在性，筆者在這篇論文，從孟子哲學的發展之觀點來探討象山哲學之淵源與心即理以及實踐方法論。

　　　　　Lu Xiang Shan's "Xin-Xue (心學)" succeeded to the philosophy of Confucius-Mencius that admitted the legislative nature of the will concerning moral laws. In Xiang Shan's philosophy Xin (心) is the good will, and Li (理) is the direction of actions that is determined by Xin itself. Xin is good-oriented necessarily, and it includes two contents: one is the judgment about Right and Wrong, and Good and Bad, another is the attitude to admit the Good and reject the Bad. The former is the function of "Liang-Zhi (良知)" but the latter is the function of "Liang-Neng (良能)". Because both "Liang-zhi" and "liang-Neng" are functions of Xin, Xin is not only the legislator of moral laws but also the fundamcntal power of moral actions. The orientation or consciousness to the Good is the beginning of moral actions; and giving the value for being into an object, with sympathy with it, and becoming one body is the end of moral actions, Because the value for being into the object is given by Xin, it is the case of "Xin-Seng-Wu (心生物)". Someone maintained that Xiang Shan's" Xin-ji-Li (心即理)" was a case of subjective idealism. But it is wrong because Xiang Shan's philosophy is not an epistemological system nor denying the reality of beings. I, in this paper, examined the grigin of Xiang Shan's "Xin Xue", the mearing of "Xin-ji-Li", and practical methodology of it, relating it to the philosophy of Mencius.