當清廷於1905年開始支持立憲時，不論一般官員或者高官，他們的態度都是極為熱衷的。整體說來，對官員而言，立憲有多重的作用，包括：政治的轉型、統治權的合理化、新的規訓秩序以及促成國家的統一與強盛。雖不是全部，但許多官員都提到了主權歸屬於君主。這造就了一種連續性的表象，亦即帝王世系繼續存在，但事實上卻激進地將帝制從其古老宇宙論上的紐帶分割開來。官員的計畫就是要將全體人民「民族化」和「公民化」。官員樂觀地相信，人民一旦施予適當教育，定將成為適合實行立憲的公民。換言之，他們似乎相信，教育不僅會將人民轉變成為瞭解其權利義務之勤奮、忠貞且愛國的公民，同時也會保護人民，使之免於受革命異端邪說的侵襲。國家管理和監督的一面，與教育和愛國思想的另一面，彼此是緊密相連的。 官員在談到立憲時所常出現的烏托邦主義與理想主義式的論調，顯示出一種有異於過去的轉變。我們看到他們對延續君主權力的堅持，而較令人印象深刻的觀點就是，皇帝的角色不過是立憲的功能之一。一些理想遠大的官員認為，立憲可以將君主與人民融合為一體。而對另外的一些官員而言，立憲至少能將政治公諸輿論，使君主做出更好的決策。歷史學家已注意到清廷的保守立場。雖說沒錯，但是他們卻忘了到1900年代還出現了一個新的觀點，就是國家乃是所有中國人之共同財產。我們需要記得，即使是對注重實際的官員來說，二十世紀之初是一個烏托邦的時機。事實上，至少在某種程度上，革命派、立憲派、地方士紳，甚至於官員，都共享一種現代民族國家之融合一體的神祕觀感。

　　　　　When the Qing court moved to support constitutionalism after 1905, both ordinary officials and high officials were extremely enthusiastic. In general, they saw in constitutionalism a real transformation of the Chinese polity: a rationalization of rulership, a new disciplinary order, and a source of national unity and strength. Many officials, though not all, spoke of locating sovereignty in the emperor. This created an appearance of continuity (the imperial order), but actually radically severed the monarchy from its old cosmological moorings. The official project was to “nationalize” and “citizenize” the masses. Officials also tended to be optimistic about the basic fitness of the people, once properly educated, to be qualified citizens. They seemed confident that education would not only turn the people into diligent, loyal, and patriotic citizens understanding both their rights and their duties, but also give them protection from the “heresies” of the revolutionaries. Surveillance and discipline on the one hand, and education and patriotism on the other, were intimately related. Still, the utopianism and idealism that surrounded officials’ rhetoric on constitutionalism marked a great break from the past. We see some insistence on preserving imperial power. But there was a stronger notion of the emperor as just one function of the constitution. At a kind of utopian extreme, some officials thought that a constitution would fully unify the people and their rulers. At the very least, improved access to public opinion would allow rulers to make better decisions. Historians have emphasized the conservatism of the Qing court. This was not wrong, but it ignored that by the early 1900s a sense of the state as the shared property of all Chinese had become widespread. We need to remember that, even for practical officials, the turn of the century was a utopian moment. Indeed, at least to a degree, revolutionaries, constitutionalists, local elites — and even officials — shared a kind of mystical sense of the “one body” of the modern nation-state.